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GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES.

SPEECH

OF

Hon. RICHARD F. PETTIGREW,
OF SOUTH DAKOTA,

IN THE

SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,

MONDAY, JUNE 4, AND TUESDAY, JUNE 5, 1900.

WASHINGTON.

1900.
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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
COMMERCE
BUREAU OF
MANUFACTURES

K.K. May 29-11

SPEECH

OF

HON. RICHARD F. PETTIGREW.

The Senate having under consideration the bill (S. 2335) in relation to the suppression of insurrection in, and to the government of, the Philippine Islands, ceded by Spain to the United States by the treaty concluded at Paris on the 10th day of December, 1898—

Mr. PETTIGREW said:

Mr. PRESIDENT: When the present session of Congress convened six months ago, the Senate expected and had a right to expect, and the American people expected, that the Administration in charge of the Government, in charge of events which were occurring in the Philippine Islands, would report to Congress the results of our operations in that distant country. A complete résumé of everything that had been done by our Army and our officers should have been laid before both Houses of Congress, but it was not done. The public was well aware that some information in regard to what had been occurring in the Philippines had reached us through the censored press and the correspondence of our soldiers. That such information was meager, that it was uncertain, and that the facts were hard to secure, was known to all. When Congress assembled, those statements regarding the situation which we had a right to expect were not forthcoming. December passed, and in January resolutions were introduced in this body calling for important facts in connection with the war on the Filipinos.

The resolutions introduced were promptly laid upon the table by the Administration majority in the Senate. Finally a resolution prepared by the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. HOAR] passed the Senate, asking the Administration for a detailed account of all its doings in connection with the Philippine Islands. We waited many weeks, and finally a partial statement was sent in. It did not cover the scope of the inquiry, and at the close of the session we are without the information. The report of the President in answer to our resolution of inquiry concerning transactions in the Philippines did not convey all the truth. It contained only fragmentary selections from the record. All that has come to us in a direct way has been printed. I believe it is insufficient; that it does not cover the ground; that such information was withheld as the Administration desired to suppress; that the American people are no longer trusted by the party in power; they are no longer taken into the confidence of their administrative servants and intrusted with the facts. Proof conclusive that facts were withheld was furnished by the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. SPOONER] in his speech a few days ago. He read from the printed reports which came from the Administration in reply to our resolutions; but, Mr. President, he also read from manuscript, more than from anything else, that which was withheld from Congress, that which had not been furnished to the whole people. He read what was accessible to Administration Senators and not accessible to other members of the Senate.

Congress is about to adjourn, the facts are withheld, and the American people are to go on another summer with such informa-

tion as they are able to gather without the confidence of an Administration that again asks for their votes.

The friends of the Administration, the imperialists in this body, have complained that we were unwilling to believe the officers of the Government and their statements regarding the situation in the Philippines. Mr. President, up to the time the treaty with Spain was sent to this body there is no doubt that the Administration sent us all the facts in its possession. Document 62 contains the story of our operations in the Philippines up to November, 1898. Since that time, owing to a change in the policy of the Government, information upon this important subject has been withheld. We base our case on the arguments that have been made up on information drawn from Document No. 62, transmitted to us, accompanied by a message from the President. Aside from the matter contained in Document 62, we have been unable to secure facts, and we are accused of not believing what is said by the officers of the Government.

We have reason, Mr. President, to question the veracity of the officers of the Government in their later utterances. There is no doubt that when our representatives first went to Manila they promised the people of those islands liberty and independence if they would help us destroy the Spanish power in the East. There is no doubt but what every American who talked with Aguinaldo and his followers gave them to understand that they would be assisted in setting up a government. There is no doubt that our consuls and our generals and Admiral Dewey gave Aguinaldo such promises in abundance: but since we decided to conquer the Philippines, to destroy republics in Asia—since we decided to deprive those people of the right to govern themselves, the reports we have received from our own officers are subject to question and to doubt—in the first place, because all the facts in possession of the Government have not been placed before us; and, in the second place, because we find our officers willing to pursue the course which Otis pursued, that of distorting the facts, or of changing the reports and placing a wrong construction upon words. It has been the general policy, from the President down, to deceive the public.

The commission we sent to the Philippines came back and made a partial report just before the election. This report is signed by Mr. J. G. Schurman, Admiral Dewey, Charles Denby, and Dean C. Worcester, and in it they say:

On the arrival of the troops commanded by General Anderson at Cavite, Aguinaldo was requested by Admiral Dewey to evacuate that place, and he moved his headquarters to the neighboring town of Bacoor. Now for the first time arose the idea of national independence.

This appears to have been on the 4th day of July, 1898, and Admiral Dewey had been in the islands and had had dealings with Aguinaldo since the previous May. Mr. Schurman had undoubtedly thoroughly investigated the question, but in order to make out a case which would justify the position they took in this report, they must insert a statement that Aguinaldo never had a notion that he desired independence until July 4, 1898.

What are the facts? They were known to Admiral Dewey. He must have known them, and Mr. Schurman must have known them; and yet they were willing to put forth a misleading statement, because it better suited the purpose for which they made their report. It is statements of this sort, not founded upon the exact truth, but enunciated for the purpose of deceiving the Amer-

ican people, that causes us to question what this commission, headed by Mr. Schurman, may say, and makes us doubt the information which we receive from the Administration.

Let us look back in the authentic record to the time when the Filipinos first declared that they desired independence. Consul Wildman tells us that a delegation of Filipinos came to him in November, 1897, and said that in case of war with Spain—and this was months before war was declared—the Filipinos then in revolt would be glad to join us and be our allies; that they aspired to independence; and Mr. Wildman so notified the State Department; and the document is official. I read from Senate Document No. 62, part 1, third session Fifty-fifth Congress, on pages 360 and 361. This is a letter from Aguinaldo to President McKinley, dated June 10, 1898:

I come to greet you with the most tender effusion of my soul, and to express to you my deep and sincere gratitude in the name of the unfortunate Filipino people for the efficient and disinterested protection which you have decided to give it to shake off the yoke of the cruel and corrupt Spanish domination, as you are doing to the equally unfortunate Cuba, which Spain wishes to see annihilated rather than free and independent. * * *

I close by protesting once and a thousand times in the name of this people, * * * a people which trusts blindly in you, not to abandon it to the tyranny of Spain, but to leave it free and independent, even if you make peace with Spain.

Again, on June 18, 1898, on page 432 of Document 62, I find the following:

I have proclaimed in the face of the whole world that the aspiration of my whole life, the final object of all my efforts and strength, is nothing else but your independence, for I am firmly convinced that that constitutes your constant desire and that independence signifies for us redemption from slavery and tyranny, regaining our liberty and entrance into the concert of civilized nations.

Here, then, was an aspiration, an aspiration clearly expressed in the proclamation by Aguinaldo on June 18, 1898, and yet our commissioners say and Dewey, in whose hands this proclamation was, says to the American people, in November, 1898, that the first thought of Aguinaldo and his people had of independence was on the 4th of July, 1898.

On page 434 of the same report appears the first article of the provisional constitution promulgated June 23, 1898, in which I find the following:

The dictatorial government will be entitled hereafter the revolutionary government, whose object is to struggle for the independence of the Philippines until all nations, including the Spanish, shall expressly recognize it, and to prepare the country so that a true republic may be established.

What can be more plain, more distinct? And yet because it suited the purpose of the Administration previous to the election of 1898, our commissioners, Dewey joining, stated to the people of this country the falsehood that the Filipinos first thought of independence on July 4, 1898.

On page 437 of Document 62, from the message of the Filipino president to his Congress, on June 23, 1898, on the desires of the Filipino government, I find the following:

It struggles for its independence in the firm belief that the time has arrived in which it can and ought to govern itself.

But back further than this we find the same record on page 351 of Document No. 62, which was sent to us by the President of the United States. Here is an address to our consul, Mr. Pratt, by the Filipinos resident in Singapore, dated June 8, 1898:

Our countrymen at home and those of us residing here, refugees from Spanish misrule and tyranny in our beloved native land, hope that the United States, your nation, persevering in its humane policy, will effica-

ciously second the programme arranged between you, sir, and General Aguinaldo in this port of Singapore, and secure to us our independence under the protection of the United States.

On page 352 we find Consul Pratt replying to the above address; and in that reply he says:

I am thankful to have been the means, though merely the accidental means, of bringing about the arrangement between General Aguinaldo and Admiral Dewey, which has resulted so happily. I can only hope that the eventual outcome will be all that can be desired for the happiness and welfare of the Filipinos.

Then, on page 346 of Document 62 I find the following proclamation of the Filipino leaders in Hongkong before Aguinaldo sailed for Manila:

Compatriots: Divine Providence is about to place independence within our reach, and a way the most free and independent nation could hardly wish for.

Aguinaldo, in a proclamation of May 8, 1898, to be found on page 431 of Document No. 62, says:

Filipinos: The great nation, North America, cradle of true liberty and friendly on that account to our people, oppressed and subjugated by the tyranny and despotism of those who have governed us, has come to manifest even here a protection which is decisive as well as disinterested toward us, considering us endowed with sufficient civilization to govern by ourselves this our unhappy land.

So I say, Mr. President, it is not without cause that we doubt the recent statements of the officers of the Government so long as the Administration refuses to send to the Senate or to give to the American people the complete facts.

Here is a report from Consul Wildman, at Hongkong, found in Document No. 62. It is dated Hongkong, July 18, 1898, and addressed to Mr. Moore, the Assistant Secretary of State:

Mr. Wildman to Mr. Moore.

CONSULATE OF THE UNITED STATES.

Hongkong, July 18, 1898.

SIR: The insurgents are fighting for freedom from Spanish rule and rely upon the well known sense of justice that controls all the actions of our Government as to their future.

In conclusion, I wish to put myself on record as stating that the insurgent government of the Philippine Islands can not be dealt with as though they were North American Indians, willing to be removed from one reservation to another at the whim of their masters. If the United States decides not to retain the Philippine Islands, its 10,000,000 people will demand independence, and the attempt of any foreign nation to obtain territory or coaling stations will be resisted with the same spirit with which they fought the Spaniards.

I have the honor, etc.,

ROUNSEVELLE WILDMAN,
Consul General.

What does Admiral Dewey say about this matter? On June 27, 1898, Admiral Dewey sent to Secretary Long the following:

I have given him (Aguinaldo) to understand that I consider insurgents as friends, being opposed to a common enemy. He has gone to attend a meeting of insurgent leaders for the purpose of forming a civil government.

"For the purpose of forming a civil government!" And yet Admiral Dewey says to the people of the United States that the insurgents under Aguinaldo and Aguinaldo himself never thought of independence until the Fourth of July, although he telegraphed to the Secretary of the Navy on the 27th of June that he had gone to attend a meeting of insurgent leaders for the purpose of forming a civil government.

Now, the fact of the matter is that in this interview Dewey advised with Aguinaldo about the form of that government and about the steps to be taken to set it up.

Admiral Dewey said:

Aguinaldo has acted independently of the squadron, but has kept me advised of his progress, which has been wonderful. I have allowed to pass by

water recruits, arms, and ammunition and to take such Spanish arms and ammunition from the arsenal as he needed. Have advised frequently to conduct the war humanely, which he has done invariably.

And yet he now declares that Aguinaldo is not an ally; and Admiral Dewey further says in his recent utterances that there was no alliance; that his purpose was only to use Aguinaldo to whip Spain. Yet Dewey telegraphed to the Secretary of the Navy that Aguinaldo was allowed to pass recruits, arms, and ammunition, and to have such Spanish arms and ammunition from the arsenal as he needed. He armed and consulted the insurgents about the whole operation; his (Aguinaldo's) progress was officially announced to have been wonderful; and yet there was no alliance! Mr. President, it is hardly necessary to comment further upon this subject. Any person who will look to ascertain what an alliance is will find that the Philippine situation at that time constituted an alliance in every particular.

I do not propose to question Admiral Dewey's veracity; but I am going to leave the public to decide that question upon the record which he has made. Compare his statements then and now and let them stand. Admiral Dewey says:

I never promised him, directly or indirectly, independence for the Filipinos. I never treated him as an ally except so far as to make use of him and his soldiers to assist me in my operations against the Spaniards. He never uttered the word "independence" in any conversation with me or my officers. The statement that I received him with military honors or saluted the Filipino flag is absolutely false.

He never treated Aguinaldo as an ally except for the purpose of using him and his soldiers to "assist me in my operations against the Spaniards." Well, who ever made fuller use of an ally in the world? Where was there ever a case? We might as well have claimed that in the Revolutionary war France was not an ally of the United States because we only used the French and their armed forces and soldiers to assist us in operations against England.

But let us see, Mr. President, whether this is a fact. In the first place Admiral Dewey says he never saluted the flag of the Filipino republic. It is well known that shortly after Aguinaldo had organized his forces a flag was adopted; that a ship was donated by one of the wealthy Filipinos to the government; that upon it was placed a battery of guns, and that it was used in operations against the Spanish garrisons at different points.

I looked up the question of a salute in the Century Dictionary. This is the definition of a salute:

In the Army and Navy a compliment paid when troops or squadrons meet. There are many modes of performing a salute, such as firing cannon or small arms, dipping colors, presenting arms, manning the yards, cheering, etc.

Webster says:

A token of respect or honor for a foreign vessel or flag by a discharge of cannon, volleys of small arms, dipping the colors or the top sails, etc.

Johnson's Universal Cyclopædia gives about the same definition. I therefore wrote to Lieut. C. G. Calkins, who was on Dewey's ship in Manila Bay through the summer of 1898, one of the officers on Dewey's own vessel, and here is what he says about it:

BRANCH HYDROGRAPHIC OFFICE,
San Francisco, Cal., March 28, 1900.

DEAR SIR: In regard to salutes to the Philippine flag in Manila Bay or elsewhere, I am satisfied that no regular naval salute was ever rendered by any vessel of Admiral Dewey's fleet. A naval salute involves the firing of guns, and none of the vessels cruising under Aguinaldo's authority had a saluting battery or made any attempt to offer a formal salute.

The references to saluting in Filipino reports are probably due to the fact that their vessels in passing through our lines, as they were freely allowed

to do, dipped their colors, and the *Olympia* and other ships did the same in response. This might be called a salute by persons unacquainted with naval routine.

Very respectfully,

C. G. CALKINS.

Hon. R. F. PETTIGREW,
Senate of the United States, Washington, D. C.

In other words, Mr. President, Admiral Dewey brands as an unqualified falsehood the statement made by Aguinaldo and by others that he saluted their flag; and when we look to the Century Dictionary, to Webster's Dictionary, or to Johnson's Universal Cyclopaedia, we find that a salute may be dipping the colors; and the executive officer of the *Olympia* says that they did dip their colors in response to the dipping of the colors of the Filipino ships as they passed by.

Murat Halstead, who was one of the officers of the present Administration in the city of Manila, says in his book, *The Story of the Philippines*:

The Philippine flag is oriental in cut and color, having red and blue bars—a white obtuse angle—the base to the staff, and a yellow moon with fantastic decorations occupying the field. This flag is one that Admiral Dewey salutes with respect.

Halstead was over there in an official capacity. He says that:

On the 17th I was appointed to take charge of the duties performed by the intendente general de hacienda or minister of finance and all fiscal affairs.

Now, let us see how it was upon land. I have here a letter addressed "To whom it may concern." It is signed by C. P. Van Houten, captain Company D, South Dakota Regiment, United States Volunteers. He says:

STATE HEADQUARTERS AMERICAN LEAGUE,
Canton, S. Dak., February 8, 1900.

To whom it may concern:

On or about the middle of September, 1898, the Philippine troops marched by the First South Dakota Regiment in columns of four, and the First South Dakota Regiment, through general orders, saluted the Philippine army by turning out guard.

C. P. VAN HOUTEN,
Ex-Captain Company D, South Dakota Troops, United States Volunteers.
H. E. GREENE, *Sergeant.*

I have another:

The Fifty-first Iowa Regiment saluted an armed body of insurgents near Calumpit during the stay of hostilities, and our men saluted the Filipino officers at Cavite.

This is signed

E. E. HAWKINS,
Late Second Lieutenant Company B, First South Dakota Infantry.

So it appears that we did salute the Filipino flag. It seemed to be very important on the part of the imperialists to show that such was not the fact. They seemed to think it absolutely necessary that it should not be established, because if they did salute the flag, if our officers helped arm them to fight the common enemy, they became our allies, and then in attacking them we attacked our allies.

Mr. Schurman, one of these commissioners who went over there to negotiate with these people, makes the following statement:

CORNELL UNIVERSITY, OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
Ithaca, N. Y., February 3, 1900.

DEAR SENATOR DEPEW: I see, from page 1362 of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, that Senator PETTIGREW, speaking of myself, says:

"The best of the matter is that he tried to bribe the insurgents, as near as we can ascertain, and failed; but they would not take gold for peace."

Had this preposterous statement been made anywhere else I should not have paid any attention to it, but as it has been made in the Senate of the United States I desire to say to you that it is absolutely without foundation.

Very truly, yours,

J. G. SCHURMAN.

Hon. CHAUNCEY M. DEFEW,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

Now, let us see whether it is without foundation or not. I go into this matter in detail, because I propose to show by the record that these men are not entitled to credit. Their statements will be used on the stump during the entire summer and fall. I quote from the Chicago Tribune of September 15, 1899, an interview purporting to be with Mr. Schurman, said to be authentic, never disputed except in this letter, which does not dispute the interview, but undertakes to dispute my statement that they undertook to bribe the insurgents:

It is stated on authority that the Schurman Peace Commission offered every possible inducement short of absolute self-government to Aguinaldo and his followers. Aguinaldo was promised as the price of the restoration of peace in the Tagalo tribe a bonus of more than \$5,000 a year while the Tagalos remained peaceful. He was told that he could chose men from his tribe for the minor municipal offices.

The commission, it is asserted, went so far as to promise Aguinaldo the moral support of the United States Government, if such were needed, to make his leadership of the Tagalos thoroughly secure.

With all these inducements, tempting as they must have been, Aguinaldo, as the recognized head of the insurgent movement, declined to yield. He insisted upon immediate self-government, and, as his insistence was so firm as to make an agreement impossible, the American commissioners ceased negotiations.

I quote from an editorial in the Chicago Tribune of September 21:

President Schurman says Aguinaldo rejected with scorn an offer to take a salary of \$5,000 and become governor of Tagals.

It seems to me it is clearly proved that they did undertake to bribe the insurgents. Further, we all know they offered, and the offer is still open, \$30 a gun for every arm they will surrender.

Now, I am going to read from the only continuous, consecutive, and faithful, so far as I can ascertain, statement of affairs in the Philippines that has been published, and that is, the statement by Aguinaldo, giving a history of the Philippine revolt from its beginning up to last fall. It is the only consecutive statement we have. The Administration refuses to furnish one; has concealed the information, and has refused to send to us the facts which are in its possession. So far they have been unable to impeach this statement in any material particular, and it has been corroborated in very many particulars. Aguinaldo says that the flag of the Filipino republic was saluted.

Ah! what a beautiful, inspiring, joyous sight that flag was, fluttering in the breeze from the topmasts of our vessels, side by side, as it were, with the ensigns of other and greater nations, among whose mighty war ships our little cruisers passed to and fro dipping their colors, the ensign of liberty and independence!

* * * * *
Admiral Dewey said his reply to the French and German admirals was—with his knowledge and consent the Filipinos used that flag, and, apart from this, he was of opinion that in view of the courage and steadfastness of purpose displayed in the war against the Spaniards the Filipinos deserved the right to use their flag.

I am going to ask to place in the RECORD as a part of my remarks, without reading, the report of Robert M. Collins, of the Associated Press, in which he makes a statement in detail in response

to the Associated Press managers of this country, with regard to the suppression of news and the total unreliability of Mr. Otis in his statements during the summer of 1899, last year. I will read the protest of the Manila correspondents, presented to Otis July 9 and cabled from Hongkong July 17, 1899.

The undersigned, being all staff correspondents of American newspapers stationed at Manila, unite in the following statement: We believe that owing to official dispatches from Manila made public in Washington the people of the United States have not received a correct impression of the situation in the Philippines, but that these dispatches have presented an ultra optimistic view that is not shared by the general officers in the field.

We believe the dispatches incorrectly represent the existing conditions among the Philippines in respect to dissension and demoralization resulting from the American campaign and to the brigand character of their army.

We believe the dispatches err in the declaration that "The situation is well in hand," and in the assumption that the insurrection can be speedily ended without a greatly increased force.

We think the tenacity of the Filipino purpose has been underestimated, and that the statements are unfounded that volunteers are willing to enlist in further service.

The censorship has compelled us to participate in this misrepresentation by existing or altering uncontroverted statements of facts on the plea, as General Otis stated, that "they would alarm the people at home," or "have the people of the United States by the ears."

Specifications: Prohibition of hospital reports; suppression of full reports of field operations in the event of failure; numbers of heat prostrations in the field; systematic minimization of naval operations, and suppression of complete reports of the situation.

ROBERT M. COLLINS,
JOHN P. DUNNING,
L. JONES,

The Associated Press.

JOHN T. McCUTCHEON,
HARRY ARMSTRONG,

Chicago Record.

OSCAR K. DAVIS,

P. G. McDONNELL,

New York Sun.

JOHN F. BASS,
WILL DINWIDDIE,

New York Herald.

E. D. KEANE,

Scripps-McRae Association.

RICHARD LITTLE,

Chicago Tribune.

The Associated Press thereupon wrote to their correspondent in the Philippines to ascertain the truth of this statement, and Mr. Collins makes a reply which I ask to have printed in the RECORD. I will read an extract from it:

The censorship enforced during the war and before the beginning of it was, according to newspaper men who had worked in Japan, Turkey, Greece, Egypt, and Russia in war times, and in Cuba under the Weyler régime and during our war, so much more stringent than any hitherto attempted that we were astonished that the American authorities should countenance it, and were confident that public opinion would be overwhelmingly against it if its methods and purposes became known.

Here, then, was a censorship of the press more thorough than that practiced by any despotic nation in the world, according to these newspapers correspondents, and yet we are asked to believe everything that Mr. Otis says:

But when General Otis came down in the frank admission that it was not intended so much to prevent the newspapers from giving information and assistance to the enemy (the legitimate function, and, according to our view, the only legitimate one of a censorship), but to keep the knowledge of conditions here from the public at home, and when the censor had repeatedly told us, in ruling out plain statements of undisputed facts, "My instructions are to let nothing go that can hurt the Administration," we concluded that protest was justifiable.

* * * * *

In this way the entire American press was made the personal organ of Otis. We were compelled to send nothing but the official view of all events and conditions, even when the official view controverted the opinions of the great mass of the officers in the field and of intelligent residents and was a falsification of events which passed before our eyes. In this way every fight became a glorious American victory, even though everyone in the army knew it to have been substantially a failure, and we were drilled into writing quite mechanically wholly ridiculous estimates of the number of Filipinos killed, knowing that if we wrote any other description than the sort being telegraphed to the War Department our work would be wasted.

For this sort of work Mr. Otis is to be promoted. I will not read more of this report, but I desire, as I said before, to have it printed as a part of my remarks.

The matter referred to is as follows:

WORKINGS OF OTIS'S CENSORSHIP.

The following is the letter to the general manager of the Associated Press from the correspondent in the Philippines, called forth by a request for an explanation of his reason for signing the protest of the correspondents against the censorship. It was written for the information of the general manager of the Associated Press:

MANILA, P. I., July 30, 1899.

MELVILLE E. STONE, Esq.,

General Manager the Associated Press, Chicago, U. S. A.

MY DEAR MR. STONE: Your request for a detailed record of all circumstances leading to the statement cabled to the newspapers by all the correspondents in Manila is just received. In the beginning, it should be explained that the correspondents had the question of taking some united action to secure the right to send the facts about the war, or failing in that, to explain to our papers and the public why we were not telling the facts two months before the cablegram was released.

The censorship enforced during the war and before the beginning of it was, according to newspaper men who had worked in Japan, Turkey, Greece, Egypt, and Russia in war times, and in Cuba under the Weyler régime and during our war, so much more stringent than any hitherto attempted that we were astonished that the American authorities should countenance it, and were confident that public opinion would be overwhelmingly against it if its methods and purposes became known.

For a long time we submitted to the censorship because of appeal to our patriotism and a feeling that we might be accused of a lack thereof if we made any trouble for the American authorities here.

But when General Otis came down in the frank admission that it was not intended so much to prevent the newspapers from giving information and assistance to the enemy (the legitimate function and, according to our view, the only legitimate one of a censorship), but to keep the knowledge of conditions here from the public at home; and when the censor had repeatedly told us, in ruling out plain statements of undisputed facts, "My instructions are to let nothing go that can hurt the Administration," we concluded that protest was justifiable.

Otis had gained the idea from the long submission by newspaper men to his dictation that it was a part of the Governor-General to direct the newspaper correspondents as he did his officers. Much of the censorship was conducted by him personally, the censor sending a correspondent to the General with any dispatch about which he had doubts. The process of passing a message was identical with the correction of a composition by a schoolmaster. Otis or the censor striking out what displeased him and inserting what he thought should be said, or what came to the same thing, telling the correspondent he must say certain things if his story was to go.

In this way the entire American press was made the personal organ of Otis; we were compelled to send nothing but the official view of all events and conditions, even when the official view controverted the opinions of the great mass of the officers in the field and of intelligent residents and was a falsification of events which passed before our eyes. In this way every fight became a glorious American victory, even though everyone in the army knew it to have been substantially a failure, and we were drilled into writing quite mechanically wholly ridiculous estimates of the numbers of Filipinos killed, knowing that if we wrote any other description than the sort being telegraphed to the War Department our work would be wasted.

Repeated appeals made by all the correspondents to their papers to secure change in censorship methods had been fruitless, and as conditions steadily grew worse and failure was piled upon failure while we were sending rose-colored pictures of successful war and inhabitants flocking to the American standard, the repeated suggestions of correspondents that "we must do something" resulted in a formal meeting.

All were agreed that their work was being made a farce; the papers were wasting money in keeping them there, that Otis might as well detail some of his own clerks to do the work. Each had his own idea of what should be done. I proposed they protest to the President against the censorship, with the request that all matter should be passed except military movements which would assist the enemy, and I thought it had better be signed by the names of the organizations and papers represented than by our names, because their display might be construed into a desire for personal advertisement. The others thought we should send a statement of the conditions, with an explanation to the public why our reports had been so misleading.

On comparing notes we found that we had among us learned the views of all the American generals and most of the other prominent men in Manila whose opinions were worth consideration, and that there was a practical unanimity of opinions of the situation. The dispatch prepared was an epitome of those opinions. These men had told us continually that our reports were misleading the people at home, and that it was our duty to tell them how affairs were going; indeed, the pressure upon us to "tell the truth" from Army officers of high rank and men of all classes has been something tremendous, and we have been accused of cowardice and all sorts of things.

Before taking any steps we concluded to talk with Otis, and he made vague promises of greater liberality in the censorship, as he had done before, and assured us, as he had done times innumerable since the beginning of the war, that the insurrection was on the verge of collapse; that he was about to administer the final blow, and that he knew these things from invaluable private sources, which would be absolutely convincing if he was at liberty to reveal them to us.

Then followed a month of history repeating itself. Before the movement of Antipolo, Taypay, and Morong we were told that it must inevitably result in the capture and destruction of Pilar's army of 2,000 or 3,000 men; then the same predictions were made of the movement to the south of Cavite Province; next, the collapse was about to come through the surrender of General Trias, who would bring over his army.

About the middle of June I wrote a conservative review to the effect that everyone here was convinced that it would be impossible to end the war during the rainy season and for some time thereafter, unless heavy reinforcements were sent.

The censor's comment (I made note of it) was: "Of course we all know that we are in a terrible mess out here, but we do not want the people to get excited about it. If you fellows will only keep quiet now, we will pull through in time without any fuss at home."

He took the story to General Otis, who said: "Tell Collins that if he will hold that for a week or ten days, he will thank me for not letting him send it," and when I went to see him repeated the same old story about the insurrection going to pieces, and hinted so portentously about having wonderful things up his sleeve that I almost believed him in the face of past experiences of the same sort. The other men had practically the same experience, each one trying to get through a story of how matters stood at the beginning of the rainy season, then on.

So, after waiting a month for the General's predictions to materialize, we decided to send the statement we had framed without changing it, as the conditions had not changed since it was written. Its form was not what I wanted, because I thought a correspondent of the Associated Press should not assume to give his own views upon any question; but, on the other hand, it was that or nothing. The views were not our personal views, but the views of Lawton, MacArthur, Funston, Wheaton, et al., and we could not be accused of prejudice against the Administration, because the strongest Administration organ in the country was committed to the plan; and, moreover, the attempt to hold the newspapers by the throat was so unusual that unusual action seemed to be justified and demanded.

As a matter of form, we took the message to the censor. His comment was practically the same that he had made on my message. He did not question the accuracy of the statement of conditions, but said: "This is just the sort of matter the censorship is intended to suppress." He, of course, took it to Otis, who in turn sent a messenger requesting Davis, of the New York Sun, to go and see him, doubtless thinking that as he had treated the Sun as his organ, and its correspondents being under obligations to him for special favors, he could work them to give up the plan. Thompson said he (Thompson) thought Collins and McCutcheon should go also, as their views had always been conservative, etc. A committee was chosen—Davis, McCutcheon, Bass, and I.

When we were ushered into Otis's room he said with some anger: "Gentlemen, you have served an extraordinary paper upon me. You accuse me of falsehood. This constitutes a conspiracy against the Government. I will have you tried by a general court-martial and let you choose the judges." We knew from experience with threats to "Put you off the island" that

there was nothing to be frightened about, and also knew that all the officers who would be on a court-martial would know we told the truth.

Three hours of exceedingly plain talk followed. The general did not contradict our statements that the purpose of the censorship was to keep the facts from the public, but said that what we wanted was to have the people stirred up and make sensations for the papers. We told him that there had never been any subject furnishing more good material for sensations than this war, and that he should be exceedingly grateful to the papers for handling it so temperately.

In that connection we reminded him that the stories of looting in soldiers' letters home had been little, if any, exaggerated. Davis and Bass told him they had personally seen our soldiers bayoneting the wounded, and I reminded him that the cutting off of the ears of two American soldiers at Dasmariñas had been merely retaliation for similar mutilations of dead Filipinos by the Americans. (No one could possibly tell stronger stories of the looting and blackmailing by our soldiers than Otis has told, although he charges it all to the volunteers.)

We told him that we had refrained from sending these things and others of similar nature because we did not wish to make sensations. We told him that the censorship was purely for the purpose of giving the impression at home that everything was lovely here, otherwise he would suppress the local papers, which print all sorts of clippings from the American papers, denouncing the Administration, and which keep the enemy posted on the position of every company in our Army and even give advance notice of intended movements.

Dealing with the specifications, we said that the hospital officers refused to give us any information as to the number of sick, on the ground that he had instructed them to withhold such facts from the papers; also that he had reported to Washington a percentage of 71 sick when the surgeons agreed that from 20 to 30 per cent of the command was sick; that not more than 10 per cent of some regiments were fit for duty, and that the hospital force was entirely inadequate, as well as the hospital room, so that they were compelled to discharge hundreds of men who were really sick to make room for more urgent cases.

His reply was that the hospitals were full of perfectly well men who were shirking and should be turned out. To send home figures of the numbers in hospitals would be entirely misleading.

We reminded him that while he had been reporting to Washington that "the volunteers will render willing service until relieved," the same volunteers were sending regimental petitions to the governors of their States to use every influence to secure their recall; that some regiments had petitioned him to relieve them from duty; that the members of various regiments had at certain stages of the war been in a frame of mind closely resembling mutiny; that the members of the Third Artillery, who had enlisted for the war with Spain, had threatened to stack their guns on the 4th of July unless discharged.

In the matter of prejudice against the Navy, it was stated on the part of the correspondents that all were compelled to change their accounts of the taking of Iloilo to make it appear that the Army had done the work with immaterial assistance from the war ships, and that only a few houses were burned. The unquestioned facts, told in the original stories, were that the soldiers did not land until three hours after the marines had raised the flag and chased the insurgents out.

General Otis explained that the Navy was so anxious for glory that it disobeyed instructions by landing before the proper time, etc., although the correspondents would not have been permitted to send that explanation had they known it, and were forced to give an entirely false account of what occurred. The fact is questioned by no one that almost all of the business quarter and much of the other sections were burned.

I reminded him that two stories by Dunning describing the work of the Navy in patrolling the coast and taking prizes were "killed" without reason, and the others agreed that the entire attitude of the censorship toward the Navy has been one of prejudice and discrimination. There seemed to be a childish fear that the Navy would get some advertising. The censor and Otis himself always made us refer to the gunboats operated by Captain Grant as "Army gunboats," in their eagerness to keep the Navy from getting any credit not its due.

Regarding the suppression of the reports of field operations which were failures, we told the general that the whole purpose of most of the important movements, beginning with the advance from La Loma Church in March, had been to round up and capture or force the surrender of various divisions of the Filipino army; that all of them had failed to accomplish this, yet we had been obliged to represent that Otis was accomplishing just what he intended and winning a series of glorious successes and administering no end of final crushing blows.

Otis is a hard man to argue with or to pin down to any definite proposition, and his explanation of the failure of Hall's expedition the first week in

June was characteristic. He said: "But how could we capture them when they were not there? They all got out the night before we started, and there were not 2,000 we found, but only 600."

We rehearsed in detail the objections to the censorship, which I have outlined in the beginning of this letter. There was no question of the fact that he had not allowed us to send full reports of the conditions here unless those reports were reflections of his own views. We asked that when there were different views held by people whose opinions were worthy of consideration we should be allowed to explain the various views and phases of the question, instead of echoing his opinions as though they were rock-ribbed and unimpeachable facts.

Davis said: "When I returned to Manila, I asked what I would be permitted to send, and you told me all facts, news about military operations not helpful to the enemy, and my opinions as opinions." All of the committee agreed that the fulfillment of that rule would be satisfactory, and I disclaimed any desire to send my personal opinions for the Associated Press. General Bates was present throughout the interview. At the close General Otis turned to him and asked, "What would you do with these gentlemen, General?"

Bates promptly replied: "I would do what I said."

"Court-martial them?" Otis asked.

"No, let them send what you promised, the facts, and opinions as opinions," Bates said.

The next morning Otis sent for Davis and tried to talk him over. Among other things he complained that he did not clearly understand what we wanted. Wishing to give him a chance to establish a reasonable censorship, we sent another committee with a written request that we be allowed to send all facts not useful to the enemy and describe the different views of the situation when it was open to differences of opinion. The committee thrashed over the same ground several hours, and the result was a statement in effect that we might send anything which in his opinion was "not prejudicial to the interests of the United States."

That did not change our position in the least, because he had always construed as damaging to the Government any story tending to carry the smallest inference that his acts and policies were not entirely successful and indorsed by the whole army. He also appointed a new censor, although we had told him that would not be the slightest relief unless the system was changed, and he promised to keep the censor fully posted on all events, an arrangement which he has not carried into execution.

There were two or three days of improvement and greater liberality in the censorship; then it dropped into the old rut. One of our complaints had been that Otis himself was practically the censor; that whenever we presented stories which the censor had doubts concerning the policy of, or dealing with matters he was ignorant of, he would send us to Otis, and we often wasted hours waiting in an anteroom and then perhaps were unable to secure an audience. We asked him to give the censor exclusive jurisdiction in the field and keep him posted on all events, giving him access to official reports from the front. This he declared would be impossible. Therefore we sent the telegram.

General Otis had complained of the language as an accusation of deliberate falsehood. We assured him we had no intention of conveying the idea that he had reported to Washington anything he did not believe to be true, and we softened the language to avoid the possibility of any such construction. He also said that the War Department had made public only the more optimistic of his reports, and we amended the dispatch to make plain that we referred only to those reports which the Department had given out. I inclose a copy of the original version.

We were entirely ignorant when we sent the message that something like an agitation against the policy in the Philippines was then afoot in America. So far as I can learn our action met the entire approval of everyone in Manila except Otis and the members of his personal staff who would feel bound to support him under any conditions.

The position of the newspaper correspondents here is, as it has been from the beginning, most difficult.

Otis had closed to us every possible source of information. Only yesterday when I attempted to send a report of the bombardment of Paete, the truthfulness of which was unquestioned, he immediately sent for Lawton, and demanded to know how it had been made public, and told Lawton to jump on the members of his staff.

Such strict orders against talking to newspaper men have been repeatedly issued that when we go about headquarters the officers avoid us as though we had smallpox, because they are afraid to be seen talking with us. Otis refuses to give us passes to go about the city after the closing hour (8.30) although such passes are given to the reporters on local papers and to business men of all nationalities, even Filipinos. All of the privileges extended to newspaper men in Cuba, like the privilege of the Government telegraph wires and access to telegrams from the front which are not of a confidential

nature, are denied us. It is impossible to maintain any system of correspondence from Iloilo and the other islands except by mail, as the officials in those places, under orders from headquarters, exercise a censorship practically prohibitive over the cable.

Instances of the suppression of news to prove that the sole intent of the authorities is to suppress accounts of the real situation here could be multiplied if it was necessary, but the repeated assertions of the censor that he was instructed to permit nothing to go of a political nature—nothing that could reflect upon the Army or “create a bad impression at home”—leaves no doubt on that point. Such items as courts-martial have been ruled out, with the explanation: “I am here to protect the honor of the Army.”

Recently I filed what I thought a most inoffensive statement that the business men who had appeared before the commission had advocated the retention of the existing silver system of currency. The censor said: “I ought not to let that go. That would be a lift for Bryan. My instructions are to shut off everything that could hurt McKinley’s Administration. That is free silver.” I explained that the silver system here was not 16 to 1, and with seeming reluctance he O. K’d the item.

The charge that we cared for nothing but to make sensations for our papers is most unjust, for I doubt if ever a body of newspaper men were more conservative in the presence of unlimited provocation for sensationalism. There have been three or four instances which I now recall of conduct by our soldiers resembling the episode of the Seventy-first New York in Cuba, which were matters of common knowledge here, and which none of us has attempted to cable nor desired to.

There has been, according to Otis himself and the personal knowledge of everyone here, a perfect orgy of looting and wanton destruction of property and most outrageous blackmailing of the natives and Chinamen in Manila, and various incidents like the shooting down of several Filipinos for attempting to run from arrest at a cock fight, not to mention courts-martial of officers for cowardice, and the dismissal of General — for getting hopelessly drunk on the eve of two important battles—all of which the correspondents have left untouched by common consent.

Also, there are the usual number of Army scandals and intrigues which we have not aired, foremost among them the fact—it is universally considered a fact in the Army—that Otis is deeply prejudiced against and jealous of Lawton, and has done everything in his power to keep Lawton in the background and prevent him from making a reputation.

As a correspondent of the Associated Press, I am supposed to have no opinion, but in writing of events like this war one must necessarily, to convey any idea of the trend of affairs, go somewhat into the field of description of conditions, etc., which are in the final analysis matters of opinion. In doing so I have endeavored merely to reflect the views of the great majority of well-informed people. Whether I have done so correctly you can easily judge by referring to the stories I sent “via Hongkong” soon after my arrival and afterwards (one on the 7th of April saying that notwithstanding the optimistic official view the war was likely to be a long one and that 100,000 men would be needed to end it). You will notice also that the tone of the Hongkong dispatches was decidedly different from those sent from Manila direct. The only time General Otis has given us any freedom was during his row with Schurman over the peace negotiations, when (by insinuation and those attempted diplomatic methods which public men seem to think newspaper men do not see through) he was encouraging us to roast Schurman and take his side.

The secret of the whole trouble here is that the Government has left a small man to deal with the most delicate problems, requiring broad statesmanship. Everyone agrees that Otis is honest, and that counts for much in a position affording such chances for dishonesty, but everybody agrees also, with most remarkable unanimity, that he has bungled affairs from the beginning; that the war might have been avoided by tact, and might have been ended before now by some other plan of campaign than slashing aimlessly about, taking a town to-day, deserting it to-morrow, retaking it the next week—and by diplomacy.

The Hongkong press, which has always championed the American side of the Philippine question, reflects the feeling of most people here in an editorial beginning: “It is not difficult to imagine the disgust and indignation that would be felt and expressed in the United States when once the country awoke to the real condition of affairs in the Philippines. There has been mismanagement of the grossest description.”

I wish the etiquette of officialdom might permit Dewey and Schurman to speak to McKinley and the public concerning Otis as freely as they have to newspaper men. Those two are the only men of the caliber of statesmen the Government has sent here, and Schurman has the college professor’s weakness of believing that all other men, including Malays, were as sincere in what they said as himself.

Otis is a bureaucrat who never leaves his desk, has never seen his soldiers in the field, and insists upon managing both the civil and military branches.

of the government, although either one would fully occupy an able man, because he trusts no one but himself, and withal has a faculty for antagonizing everyone with whom he has to deal, as he has antagonized the newspaper men.

Very truly, yours,

ROBERT M. COLLINS.

Mr. PETTIGREW. Mr. President, we have before us a bill to continue the authority which the President has been heretofore exercising until the revolt in the Philippines is suppressed:

A bill (S. 2355) in relation to the suppression of insurrection in, and to the government of, the Philippine Islands, ceded by Spain to the United States by the treaty concluded at Paris on the 10th day of December, 1898.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That when all insurrection against the sovereignty and authority of the United States in the Philippine Islands, acquired from Spain by the treaty concluded at Paris on the 10th day of December, 1898, shall have been completely suppressed by the military and naval forces of the United States, all military, civil, and judicial powers necessary to govern the said islands shall, until otherwise provided by Congress, be vested in such person and persons, and shall be exercised in such manner as the President of the United States shall direct for maintaining and protecting the inhabitants of said islands in the free enjoyment of their liberty, property, and religion.

And this, after a six months' session of Congress, is all that the Administration offers in this connection. We are told that when all resistance is suppressed the President is to govern the Philippine Islands as an emperor (without restraint, without advice, absolute despotic power enforced by an army) would govern his empire. We are asked to vest in him authority greater than that enjoyed to-day by any other person ruling over any other people on the face of the globe. Yet, while this bill when it was introduced was undoubtedly the policy of the Administration, it appears that it has now been abandoned, and the intention is that Congress shall adjourn and that nothing will be done. I read in the morning paper what purports to be an interview sent back from Manila by Judge Taft, of the new peace commission which we have sent to the Orient. He says:

I am surprised that Manila has not received news regarding the Spooner bill, a measure calculated to help us greatly in our work here.

In other words, when Mr. Taft sailed for the Philippines the programme evidently was to pass the Spooner bill and make him the civil governor, or rather the despot, of the Philippine Islands, with all power in his hands; and he is surprised that the news has not reached Manila of the Spooner bill. Why? Because the Administration has changed its policy and there is no purpose or intention on the part of the party in power to pass this measure.

It is said that we are encouraging the Filipinos by discussing this question. Mr. President, I hope my voice will never be raised except in encouragement of every aggregation of people throughout the world of every race who are struggling for independence, I care not what color or where they live, who are striving to establish a government based upon the principles of our Constitution and our Declaration of Independence.

Mr. President, I offered the following amendment as a substitute for the bill introduced by the Senator from Wisconsin, which I present as embodying what I think ought to be done in this connection:

That all hostile demonstrations on the part of the armed forces of the United States in the Philippine Islands shall at once cease, and that we offer to the people of said islands self-government based upon the principles of our Constitution and the Declaration of Independence, and that negotiation on this basis be at once opened with the existing native government for a settlement of all differences, with a view to the speedy withdrawal of our armed forces, and that full authority is vested in the President of the United States to carry out the provisions of this act.

I propose that we shall cease all armed hostile demonstration against the people of those islands, that we shall negotiate with them and at once to set up a government patterned after our own, after the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States.

It is said on the part of the imperialists in this body that by advocating this course we are giving aid, comfort, and encouragement to the enemies of our country. This I deny. Mr. President, the people of the Philippines are not the enemies of my country. What have they done to us that we can charge them with being the enemies of the people of the United States? They joined us in a contest to drive Spain from the Philippine Islands. They were our allies and fought by our side. They took 9,000 Spanish prisoners. They laid down their lives in great numbers in order to fight a common foe. They captured the entire Spanish garrisons in the Philippine Islands, except in the city of Manila, and invested that so that the Spaniards were unable to escape. What have they done to us? Nothing but resist aggression, nothing but combat our forces attacking them and undertaking to destroy their liberties. If we would cease hostile demonstration against the people of the Philippines, do you think they would attack us? Do you believe for one moment there would be any difficulty in establishing the most cordial and friendly relations? Why should we go on with this war of conquest?

Have we any other title to these islands than conquest? It is true that our opponents dispute upon that question. Some of them say that we acquired title by purchase. I think that is the view of the Administration: I think that was the view of the Senator from Wisconsin; but others who undertake to justify this course of aggression claim that we acquired title by conquest.

Mr. FAIRBANKS. Will the Senator from South Dakota permit me to interrupt him? I think he misunderstood the position of the Senator from Wisconsin. He expressly denied that the Government acquired the Philippines by purchase.

Mr. PETTIGREW. Does he contend that we acquired them by conquest?

Mr. FAIRBANKS. That is as I understand the Senator's position; at least, he disclaimed the proposition that we acquired them by purchase.

Mr. PETTIGREW. I think he was perfectly right in disclaiming the proposition that we acquired them by purchase; and if that is the case, and I presume the Senator from Indiana is right, I accept the correction. I will read from Kent's Commentaries, volume 1, page 177:

With respect to the cession of places or territories by a treaty of peace, though the treaty operates from the making of it, it is a principle of public law that the national character of the place agreed to be surrendered by treaty continues as it was under the character of the ceding country until it be actually transferred. Full sovereignty can not be held to have passed by the mere words of the treaty without actual delivery. To complete the right of property, the right to the thing and the possession of the thing must be united. This is a necessary principle in the law of property in all systems of jurisprudence. * * * This general law of property applies to the right of territory no less than to other rights.

I read also from a treatise on international law, by Mr. Baker, published recently in Boston by Little, Brown & Co.:

In modern times sales and transfers of national territory to another power can only be made by treaty or some solemn act of the sovereign authority of the state. And such transfers of territory do not include the allegiance of its inhabitants without their consent, express or implied.

At page 355 the same author says:

The rule of public law with respect to the allegiance of the inhabitants of a conquered territory is, therefore, no longer to be interpreted as meaning that it is absolutely and unconditionally acquired by conquest, or transferred and handed over by treaty as a thing assignable by contract and without the assent of the subject.

On the contrary, the express or implied assent of the subject is now regarded as essential to a complete new allegiance.

What are the facts in regard to the Philippines? We could not purchase title unless they could deliver possession of the property purchased. The facts are simply these: When we decided to attack Spain, when Dewey was ordered to sail from Hongkong and to destroy the Spanish fleet, a rebellion was going on in the Philippine Islands. The inhabitants of those islands were trying to throw off the Spanish yoke. Knowing that at Singapore there was a man the most capable among the Filipinos who led a former revolt, our officers in the East induced this man to go back to Manila and organize the insurgent forces. Aguinaldo arrived on the 17th day of May, 1898. He immediately organized the insurgent forces. He purchased arms in Hongkong. Admiral Dewey furnished him with arms taken from the Spanish forces, and he attacked the Spanish garrisons all over the province of Cavite and secured arms from his prisoners. He pursued this course during the summer of 1898, until he had captured the entire island of Luzon except two Spanish garrisons, very small ones, and before winter he captured those. Dewey in his report says his progress was wonderful. He took 9,000 prisoners. After having captured the entire island he set up a government, which was a peaceful government, a government suitable to those people, a government which protected life and property throughout the entire area of that country. He also captured the southern islands, the island of Panay, of Cebu, and Negros, and organized governments there.

He assembled an army of 30,000 men and surrounded Manila. His army was intrenched. He invested the city on the land side, while our Navy blockaded the port on the ocean side. We acted in absolute concert with each other, consulted together, and when Manila was finally taken our troops landed, asking the insurgents to give up about a quarter of a mile of their trenches. They marched out and allowed our troops to occupy a portion of their works. They believed that they were to act in concert with us in the attack upon Manila. When the attack was ordered, their troops marched into the city along with ours. They took the principal suburbs of Manila. We took and occupied the walled city. When they came to the walled city, which contained less than one-fifth of the population of the city of Manila, they found our bayonets turned against them. They were told that they could not enter. They had lost thousands of lives in their contest with Spain. They were in possession of that entire country, and yet, although in the assault upon the city of Manila they had lost more men than we did, they were denied admittance to the city, and they yielded and occupied the suburbs for some time.

Finally we requested that they retire from the suburbs, and they retired. Aguinaldo asked that he might be permitted to retire slowly, as it was difficult to govern his people and convince them that it was right that they should surrender possession of territory which they had conquered and for which many of their comrades had laid down their lives. He also asked that in case we made a treaty with Spain the territory which he had conquered should be restored to him, and this we refused. So we did not conquer the

islands from Spain, for Spain had been conquered and driven out by the government of Aguinaldo. We had simply helped to take the city of Manila. Therefore we took no title by conquest from Spain, for at the time of making the treaty with Spain we had not conquered any territory from her.

We did not acquire title by purchase, because title by purchase requires delivery of possession; and as Spain was not in possession, she could not and did not deliver the islands to us. By what right, then, are we there? By no right in morals or law; by no right that can be defended before God or man. We are there as conquerors, we are there as the armed banditti would enter your premises in daytime, and we have no better right to be there than the bandit has to enter and despoil your home.

If our title is by conquest, then it is as yet incomplete. If our title is by conquest, we did not acquire it from Spain, and it is nearly two years since the war with Spain ceased, and yet the conquest is in progress.

In October he was again asked to give up more territory. He was again asked to retire his troops beyond not only the city of Manila, but the adjoining towns. Then he called the attention of General Otis to the fact that the towns which Otis desired him to surrender were not a part of Manila—you will find it on pages 20 and 21 of General Otis's report. General Otis said, "You are right; the territory which I now demand I can not find as embraced in the city of Manila or its suburbs; but," he said, "that makes no difference; I insist upon the possession of the territory anyway." So our lines were pushed out constantly, creating irritation and bad feeling.

Finally Dewey seized the ships of the Filipinos in the harbor. Was not that an act of war? Why talk longer about who commenced the war in the Philippines, when in October we seized the vessels of our allies—and they were vessels of war—dismissed the men who manned them, took down the Filipino flag and removed it from the sea?

On the 24th of November Otis again wrote to Aguinaldo saying that he must retire beyond the village of Santa Mesa, and that if he did not he would attack him. On the 21st of December the President sent a proclamation to be published in the Philippines telling the inhabitants that the United States had assumed sovereignty over the islands—a proclamation which was a clear declaration of war—a declaration that we would extend our military control then existing in the city of Manila throughout the entire area of the group.

This proclamation was published in the Philippines on the 4th of January, 1899. Of what necessity, I say, Mr. President, is there for trying to ascertain who commenced the war, when it is demonstrated that we seized their ships in October, when we drove them beyond the territorial limits of the city of Manila, the only country we had occupied or had a right to occupy under the protocol with Spain, when we on the 4th day of February attacked their forces and fired the first and the second shot, and killed three of their people? I say of what use is it to try to contend that those people began the war. And after that, on the 5th day of February, the day after hostilities were inaugurated, Aguinaldo asked to have hostilities cease, and said that he had no notion of making an attack upon our people and had not done so. The reply was that, fighting having once commenced, it should go on to the grim end.

I say under these circumstances we are precluded from taking any other position than that we betrayed and attacked an ally; that we are now undertaking to conquer an unwilling people, and that the only honest and honorable course for us to pursue is to withdraw our armed forces and negotiate with the Filipinos for the establishment of a government.

To-day our army occupies a few towns. Out of the 1,100 villages in the Philippines having more than 2,000 people we occupy, according to the Army reports, less than one-fourth. We occupy to-day and hold possession simply of the territory upon which is planted the feet of our soldiers, and beyond the range of their guns we have no possession whatever. Those people are furnishing their own government and are pursuing the peaceful course of life described by the two officers of the Navy who traveled through the islands in the summer of 1898.

Tuesday, June 5, 1900.

Mr. PETTIGREW. Mr. President, it is customary when the English nation wishes to conquer a weaker people to deprive them of their rights, their liberties, and their government, to begin a systematic course of slander and libel against them, to begin to assert that they are in every way bad and possess infamous customs, and after public prejudice has been manufactured, England marches an army into the coveted territory and begins killing the inhabitants and conquering the country.

Aguinaldo and his followers are a grand people. You can not find a line in Document No. 62, sent to us by the President, that does not describe the people of the Philippines as a Christian people, 6,000,000 out of the 7,000,000 being members of the Catholic church, having schools and churches in all their towns; not a line that does not describe Aguinaldo and his followers as men worthy to act with us.

When we decided to conquer that country our course was changed. Then we began to imitate England and to slander the people; then Aguinaldo was a half-caste, without character, and had taken a bribe, and after that we heard rumors that he had issued orders, or one of his chief officers had issued orders, for the murder of the inhabitants of Manila, sparing no one. The Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. SPOONER] repeated and repeated again a document purporting to have been signed by Sandico, a member of Aguinaldo's cabinet, and he commented on it. It purports to have been a proclamation. It is unsigned. It was picked up in Manila. It was anonymous as sent to us. It never was signed by anybody, and yet when Otis was asked who issued it he reported back that Sandico was the author. Now, I deny that Sandico ever issued it, and I assert that it is a forgery. Yet it is brought in here to prove that these people are a bloodthirsty race, and that they intended to murder the inhabitants of Manila who were foreign born.

There is nothing in Aguinaldo's history or the history of his people since the difficulties commenced to justify the charge. We captured the Spanish garrison in Subig Bay, 1,300 prisoners were surrendered to us, and Admiral Dewey turned them over to the insurgents. If they were bloody monsters and savages, would we have done that? Aguinaldo captured Iloilo when our fleet anchored off that city and threatened to bombard it. The English and the German residents sent out a delegation of citizens to ask us to desist, saying that life and liberty were thoroughly protected

and that there was peace within the town. General Miller reported these facts to General Otis. He said the Filipinos were collecting the customs, were administering the government, and he advised an immediate attack upon Iloilo, because he said if they discovered they could do these things they might want to continue to do them. This information can be found in Otis's report.

To offset all this; to offset the admitted facts that they treated their prisoners kindly; that they did not even kill the members of the religious orders against whom they had their greatest grievances, but preserved their lives and cared for them—against all this an anonymous circular is produced and commented upon in order to prove that the Filipino people are savages.

The Senator from Wisconsin commented upon this section of the circular:

Second, Philippine families only will be respected; they should not be molested, but all other individuals, of what race they may be, will be exterminated without apprisement (or) compassion, after the extermination of the army of occupation.

And so on. Now, let us go deeper into the facts touching upon this circular. I hold in my hand an article from Harper's Magazine of August, 1899, entitled "Filipino insurrection of 1896," written from a study of the Spanish archives left in Manila, by Lieut. Carlos Gilman Calkins, of the United States Navy, one of the officers of Dewey's flagship. He says:

In August (1893) the champion of denunciation, the chief of clerical detectives, came forward, Fray Mariano Gil, of the Augustinian order, parish priest of a huge-domed church at Fondo, a northern suburb of Manila. A native was led to make avowals which enabled this friar to discover certain articles which might pass for "concrete proof" in the curious legal system of the Latin races. One of them was a stamp used in receipting for monthly dues of members in a lodge of the Katipunan. Incriminating documents and lists were taken from the same locker in the office of the *Diario de Manila*, the oldest journal in the island. Fortified with these, the police hurried to make arrests, and the period of panic began on August 20. This amateur detective was hailed as a savior to society, and his services were compared with those of Father Urdaneta, the Augustinian who piloted the expedition for the conquest and conversion of the archipelago in 1564.

On August 30 Blanco had to proclaim martial law throughout the Tagalo provinces. He was also forced, much against his will, to accept the services of volunteers, including all able-bodied Spaniards. Magistrates hurried to join their companies. Courts were closed and civil law was extinguished. The lives of some 2,000,000 people lay at the mercy of courts-martial—of summary courts martial, since *sumarisimo* is the watchword of Spanish military justice.

The principal document cited in justification of these extraordinary measures is a proclamation attributed to the chiefs of the Katipunan, of which the essential clause is as follows: "When the signal H. 2 Sep. is given, each brother will perform the duty imposed by this grand lodge, murdering all Spaniards, their women and children, without consideration for kindred, friendship, or gratitude." Other savage directions follow, but they were never carried into execution.

The document may be, in some degree, authentic. It may have been drawn by some native agitator, and even adopted by some lodge of the Katipunan; but we can not accept the assertion that Rizal and other intellectual martyrs were responsible for this atrocious jargon. There is a recurrent legend that plots have been formed "to kill all Spaniards, each servant slaying his master." This was the charge against the native priests shot in 1872, and the rumor was revived on December 13, 1898, substituting Americans for Spaniards.

This old document, issued in 1872, to justify the butchery of the Filipinos, is repeated, changing the word "Spaniards" to "Americans," and is issued again to prove that Aguinaldo is a savage.

Let us see what Mr. Foreman says. On page 589 of Document No. 62, Part II, Fifty-fifth Congress, third session, which was

transmitted to us by the President, a statement before the Peace Commission at Paris, signed by John Foreman, reads as follows:

Any governor-general who displeases the monks is recalled. In recent times General Despujols had to leave in 1892, after eight months of office, because he ceased to be a persona grata to the priests. A native, Dr. Rizal, had written and published some facts about the monastic orders, and Despujols refused to have this man put to death for it.

Then, again, he ordered a search to be made in a convent of the Austrian friars, and there he found a printing press and seditious leaflets being printed for the priests, who intended, by distributing them, to attribute to the natives an attempted revolt.

It had been the custom, Mr. President, in order to justify the course of the Spanish Government toward these people, to find an excuse for the Spanish authorities to the persecution of the Filipinos to issue these anonymous or forged circulars, in order to excite the animosity of mankind against the Filipinos, and we are following this same practice. That is all there is to the Sandico circular.

The other document which has been circulated and which came to us, anonymous as it was, purporting to have been found among Aguinaldo's papers, was a letter written to the commanding Spanish officer at Iloilo in October urging that officer to surrender and join the insurgent forces. Even if the document is genuine—but I believe it is spurious—it was written after we had seized the ships of war of the Filipino republic in the harbor of Manila, and had thus begun a conflict against them. They could regard us no longer as allies and friends after that act.

Mr. President, it has been said that we were forced to take title to those islands from Spain because, if we had not done so, Spain would have reconquered them, and that we could not turn them over to Spain. With what grim satisfaction Spain must look upon our efforts to acquire a title which she could not deliver! What grim revenge it must be to her to view the loss of nearly 2,000 soldiers by us and the expenditure of the vast sums of money which it has cost us, not to conquer the Philippines, but to occupy 240 of the 1,100 towns of that country, to feel that we possess nothing except the territory which we actually occupy with our armies! How Spain must rejoice to know that not a soldier of ours can step anywhere in the islands outside of the protection of our guns without losing his life!

What page in history gives an account of a more noble and determined effort to secure their independence than that written by the Filipinos? I say, Mr. President, that if we had not taken title from Spain, she could not have recovered the islands. Crippled, her fleet destroyed, bankrupt, Spain had not the power to reconquer the Philippines, and if we had simply left them out of the treaty to-day they would be free and independent; to-day they would be administering the quiet and the peaceful government which we found after the destruction of the Spanish fleet; to-day a republic would exist there founded upon our Constitution and our Declaration of Independence. I say Spain could not have reconquered the islands; that they would have been free and independent, and for proof of that I read from Document 62, page 369. This is a hearing before the Paris peace commission. The witness is General Merritt, fresh from the Philippines, fresh from the capture of Manila. The query was put to him by Mr. Gray, one of the commissioners:

Suppose by final treaty with Spain we should abandon Luzon and all the Philippines, exacting such terms and conditions and guaranties as we should think necessary, and abandon them entirely, reserving only a coaling station, perhaps, what do you think they would do about it?

General MERRITT. I think in the island of Luzon they would fight to the bitter end. I have talked with a number of them, intelligent men, who said their lives were nothing to them as compared with the freedom of their country and getting rid of Spanish government.

Mr. DAVIS. Do you think Spain would be able to reduce them?

General MERRITT. No, sir.

Where, then, goes all this talk about turning them over to Spain? At the time General Merritt gave that testimony the Filipinos had captured every Spanish garrison in the island of Luzon; they were in possession of the entire territory; and two naval officers, traveling for sixty days, give an account of the peaceful government they found. They testify that in one of the towns they entered they found Spanish merchants pursuing their business, unmolested and protected by the people. Day by day the account of their journey through those peaceful communities must convince any unbiased person that those people are capable of self-government, and were actually practicing it. Turn them back to Spain! That was impossible.

I also read from Document No. 62 a statement by General Merritt before the Paris Peace Commission. This question was asked by Mr. FRYE, the chairman of the commission:

Q. Were they of material assistance to us?

General Merritt answers:

A. Very great. If the protocol had not been signed, I think the Spanish at home would have insisted upon their army doing something. They dismissed Augustin because he was not disposed to fight, and I think if they had not had this experience of having been driven back into the city and the water cut off, so even that Jandenes said he could not remove his noncombatants, the Government would have insisted on his making a fight, and he could have made a very good one, for his position was strong, if they had any fight in them at all. But every place had been taken from them by the Filipinos, who managed their advances and occupation of the country in an able manner.

General Whittier, page 500, Document 62.

The CHAIRMAN:

Q. How many men did he get together?

A. His forces went around the city, taking the waterworks and the north part of the city, and running up the railroad. I asked that question of several, and the opinions differed widely—all the way from 8,000 to 30,000 or 40,000 men.

Q. Do you think he had as many as 8,000 men before the surrender?

A. Yes, sir; the environment of the city took a great many men. There is a vast extent of country there, including the waterworks and running around the city, and they certainly had to have more than that to do so.

Q. How many arms did Dewey turn over to them?

A. I never knew exactly. I asked him that question, and he said a very few.

Q. Where did they get the rest of their arms?

A. Some captured from the Spanish, some brought to him by deserters, and there were some shipments of arms from Hongkong—I believe Americans brought them in—and they have lately taken some to Batangas, in the southern part, and have taken some new Maxim guns in there, too.

Mr. GRAY:

Q. To the insurgents?

A. Yes.

Q. Since the capitulation?

A. Yes; they changed the name of a vessel and used it. She had had a Luzon name, the *Pasig*, and they changed it to the *Abby*. Dewey sent down and seized the boat, and the insurgents followed to Manila Bay, hoping to reclaim it. In other respects their demands, from their point of view, have not been unreasonable, and show a proper appreciation of the status.

The whole country had been captured by Aguinaldo and his people; the Spanish soldiers had been taken prisoners, their arms taken from them, and those who were left had been driven into Manila; the town had been surrounded, and yet Senators stand here and say, "We had to take title to those islands because we could not turn them back to Spain!" France might as well have

said to us after our Revolution that she would take title to the American colonies, because she could not turn them back to England. If the French had done what we did in Manila, we would not have waited for their forces to be augmented by new levies; we would not have waited for ship after ship to come across the sea loaded with troops, as the Filipinos did with us. If France had said that she asserted sovereignty over this country and that she proposed to extend her military rule over the American colonies, without waiting for any more troops we would have destroyed those she had here; but the Filipinos trusted in our promises; having fought side by side with us and having been our allies they still further trusted and trusted until we had increased our army and our navy in those waters, and then we turned our guns against them.

Senator FRYE seems to have understood the situation at Paris, for he asked Commander Bradford, of the United States Navy, the following question (Document 62, page 488):

Mr. FRYE:

Q. I would like to ask just one question in that line. Suppose the United States in the progress of that war found the leader of the present Philippine rebellion an exile from his country in Hongkong and sent for him and brought him to the islands in an American ship, and then furnished him 4,000 or 5,000 stands of arms, and allowed him to purchase as many more stands of arms in Hongkong, and accepted his aid in conquering Luzon, what kind of a nation, in the eyes of the world, we would appear to be to surrender Aguinaldo and his insurgents to Spain to be dealt with as they please?

A. We become responsible for everything he has done; he is our ally, and we are bound to protect him.

The day after the surrender (August 13) four representatives of Aguinaldo called on General Merritt, who assured them in general terms that "we are the friends of the Filipinos." At that time they occupied a portion of Manila. We soon demanded that they should give that up, to which Aguinaldo's representative agreed, but in seeking confirmation from him the condition was made that in case we gave up the country they should be restored to the positions then occupied and which they had taken greatly by their own merits. However, matters have been amicably settled. Aguinaldo's headquarters are at Malolos, 23 miles up the railroad. His troops control all the settled part of the island (except Manila), as well as much of the southern country.

The CHAIRMAN:

Q. What do you mean by the "southern country"—those islands below?

A. Yes.

Their conduct to their Spanish prisoners has been deserving of the praise of all the world. With hatred of priests and Spaniards, fairly held on account of the conditions before narrated, and with every justification to a savage mind for the most brutal revenge, I have heard no instance of torture, murder, or brutality since we have been in the country.

Here is what General Anderson says in the North American Review of February 19, 1900:

On the 1st of July, 1893, I called on Aguinaldo with Admiral Dewey. He asked me at once whether "the United States of the North" either had recognized or would recognize his government—I am not quite sure as to the form of his question, whether it was "had" or "would." In either form it was embarrassing.

Not embarrassing to us, Mr. President, if we had been honest; not embarrassing to us if we did not intend to deceive. Why was it embarrassing? It was because he had orders to use those people to fight the common foe. Would it have been embarrassing if he had been instructed to pursue an upright and an honorable course, and to say to Aguinaldo, "I have been ordered to take this country and annex it to the United States, and you can expect nothing from us?" That was the only decent course a great and mighty nation like this could have adopted; but we did not do it. So he says:

My orders were, in substance, to effect a landing, establish a base, not to go beyond the zone of naval cooperation, to consult Admiral Dewey, and to

wait for Merritt. Aguinaldo had proclaimed his government only a few days before (June 23), and Admiral Dewey had no instructions as to that assumption. The facts as to the situation at that time I believe to be these: Consul Williams states in one of his letters to the State Department that several thousand Tagals were in open insurrection before our declaration of war with Spain. I do not know as to the number, yet I believe the statement has foundation in fact. Whether Admiral Dewey and Consuls Pratt, Wildman, and Williams did or did not give Aguinaldo assurances that a Filipino government would be recognized, the Filipinos certainly thought so probably inferring this from their acts rather than from their statements.

Anderson says they inferred probably from their acts rather than from their statements. I care not the ground upon which they inferred it, whether from a definite and specific act or from their statements, the fact remains that our officers knew that the Filipinos expected independence:

If an incipient rebellion was already in progress, what could be inferred from the fact that Aguinaldo and thirteen other banished Tagals were brought down on a naval vessel and landed in Cavite? Admiral Dewey gave them arms and ammunition, as I did subsequently, at his request. They were permitted to gather up a lot of arms which the Spaniards had thrown into the bay; and, with the 4,000 rifles taken from Spanish prisoners and 2,000 purchased in Hongkong, they proceeded to organize three brigades and also to arm a small steamer they had captured. I was the first to tell Admiral Dewey that there was any disposition on the part of the American people to hold the Philippines if they were captured.

Anderson, then, was the first who told Admiral Dewey. I say the inference is that Admiral Dewey did, as Aguinaldo says, promise him independence. When Anderson came over he was the first, he says, to tell Admiral Dewey that there was a disposition on the part of the American people to hold the Philippines if they were captured. Why did they not tell the Filipinos so? Why did he allow them to sacrifice their lives in assaulting the city of Manila and act with us until the city fell? Who is it that pretends to stand up here and say now, in the face of these facts, that the Filipinos began the war against us? No; there is no example in the history of the world of such a spirit of forbearance as was manifested by these people after they discovered that we had turned against them.

The current of opinion was setting that way when the first expeditionary force left San Francisco, but this the Admiral had had no reason to surmise. But to return to our interview with Aguinaldo. I told him I was acting only in a military capacity; that I had no authority to recognize his government; that we had come to whip the Spaniards, and that, if we were successful, the indirect effect would be to free them from Spanish tyranny.

Here he knew that we were going to keep the islands, and yet he told the Filipinos that we wanted to act in conjunction with Aguinaldo and his forces to whip the Spaniards and to free them from Spanish tyranny; and he went there bearing the information to Dewey that we proposed to keep the islands.

I say, Mr. President, that if any people in America to-day are contending for the honor of the American flag it is the people who protest against the course pursued against these people in the Orient. If any people in America to-day are slandering the flag and covering it with shame and sneering it with dishonor, it is this Administration and the Senators on this floor who defend its course.

I added that as we were fighting a common enemy I hoped we would get along amicably together. He did not seem pleased with this answer.

I do not wonder. At this time he had conquered the whole of Luzon and several other islands to the south, had driven Spain into Manila, and drawn a line of earthworks from ocean to ocean, clear around that city. He had acted with us; he had been brought from Singapore because he was considered fit to be our

ally, and because he was considered a most capable man to assist us in crushing out Spanish power.

He did not seem pleased with this answer. The fact is, he hoped and expected to take Manila with Admiral Dewey's assistance.

He had a right to so hope. Admiral Dewey said he could take Manila at any time, and therefore there was no necessity for our sending a single soldier to Manila. These men who were good enough for us to turn our prisoners over to at Subig Bay, who were good enough to act with our fleet in taking the city, and after we had taken it and after we had acted with them and compelled a surrender, we would never have lost the life of a soldier in the Philippines, not one, for we need not have sent a soldier there; and yet we have treated them in this shameful manner. Dewey telegraphed before a soldier had arrived that he could take Manila any day, and that telegram is in his official report. Why did he not do it? Why did he invite those people to come and assist us and promise them independence? He had advised with them in regard to drawing up a constitution and establishing a civil government. Now, I ask, why did they not take Manila and save all this bloodshed, and save, above all, the honor of our flag and the honor of our country and build a republic there?

"Oh," Senators say, "the Filipinos would have sacked Manila." There is no proof of it. They took possession of cities of 40,000 people; they took possession of cities of 20,000 people; they took possession of cities of 10,000 people; and there is not an instance where there was any massacre of the inhabitants or the destruction of any property. Read again the report of Sargent and Wilcox, two naval officers who traveled through that island, and you will find that they stated there was peace and protection such as has not existed where our occupation has gone.

And he was bitterly disappointed when our soldiers landed at Cavite. In a few hours after our interview two of my staff officers, Major Cloman and Lieutenant Clark, who were walking through the streets of the town, were arrested and taken before Aguinaldo. They were told by him that strangers could only visit the town by his permission, but that in their case he was pleased to give them permission to proceed. We at once landed our forces, and on the 4th of July Aguinaldo was invited to witness a parade and review in honor of our national holiday. He did not come, because he was invited not as President but as General Aguinaldo.

Dewey says that he never saluted or treated Aguinaldo with military honors. The proof is conclusive that he did. He was invited as "General Aguinaldo."

This led me to write him a letter stating that while we hoped to have amicable relations with him, I would have to take Cavite as a base of operations, and closing with this sentence:

"I have therefore to ask, your excellency to instruct your officials not to interfere with my officers in the performance of their duties and not to assume that officers or men can not visit Cavite without your permission."

A few days thereafter he made an official call, coming with cabinet and staff and a band of music. On that occasion he handed me an elaborate schedule for an autonomous government which he had received from some Filipinos in Manila, with a statement that they had reason to believe that Spain would grant them such a form of government. With this was an open letter addressed to the Filipino people from Pedro Alexandre Paterno advising them to put their trust in Spain rather than America. The day before two German officers had called on Aguinaldo, and I believed they had brought him these papers. I asked him if the scheme was agreeable to him. He did not answer, but asked if we, the North Americans, as he called us, intended to hold the Philippines as dependencies. I said I could not answer that, but that in one hundred and twenty years we had established no colonies.

Anderson says, "I could not answer that." I have just read where he says to Admiral Dewey—and he was the first one to advise Admiral Dewey that we proposed to keep the islands—that

he could not answer it. What were his instructions? To lie to the Filipinos? Did he go over there with instructions to deceive and falsify? Of course if he did he could not answer, because as an officer of the Army he must obey his instructions. He says, "I could not answer that," and yet he knew it, because he says he was the one who bore the intelligence to Dewey.

I said I could not answer that, but that in one hundred and twenty years we had established no colonies. He then made this remarkable statement—

That is, Aguinaldo—

"I have studied attentively the Constitution of the United States, and I find in it no authority for colonies and I have no fear."

He understood the Constitution better than some of the members of this Senate and a good deal better than the Administration. "He had studied our Constitution attentively." If the President would do that he would not be undertaking, in violation of that Constitution, to conquer a people and to govern them by despotic power against their will.

The prevailing sentiment of the Filipinos toward us can be shown by one incident.

About the middle of July the insurgent leaders in Cavite invited a number of our Army and Navy officers to a banquet. There was some postprandial speech making, the substance of the Filipino talk being that they wished to be annexed but not conquered. One of our officers in reply assured them that we had come, not to make them slaves, but to make them free men. A singular scene followed. All the Filipinos rose to their feet and Buencameno, taking his wineglass in his hand said: "We wish to be baptized in that sentiment." Then he and the rest poured the wine from their glasses over their heads.

Statements have been made to the effect that Manila was taken by agreement—

And then General Anderson goes into that question. I will read the portion with regard to the taking of Manila by agreement, and I will leave the people of this country to judge whether it was not taken by agreement, and whether every life that was lost in the taking of Manila was not sacrificed to Spanish pride. The Dakota boys were murdered in that assault, an assault absolutely unnecessary. It was made because they were afraid that, if we did not pursue the course we pursued, the Filipinos would get into Manila:

The negotiations by which it was attempted to secure a surrender without resistance were carried on through Mr. André, the Belgian consul. His method was to go to the Governor-General and get a statement, which he wrote down in a memorandum book; then he would go to General Merritt and Admiral Dewey and get a statement from them, which he would carry back to the Governor-General. This was apart from some formal correspondence. After the surrender, André translated to me the notes in his memorandum book, for they were written in Spanish. The substance of the agreement seemed to be that if the fleet did not throw shells into the walled city or the Spanish part of Manila the Spanish artillery would not open on the fleet.

We could shoot at the part of the city occupied by the native Filipinos all we pleased, kill as many of them as we had a mind to, if we would not shoot at the Spaniards. Whom were we fighting? Spain. Whom had our boys enlisted to fight? Spain. And yet the agreement was that we were not to shoot at the Spanish part of the city, where the Spanish garrison was, and then they would not fire back at us!

There was no agreement, as the memorandum was read to me, that our land forces would not be fired on.

Dewey said he could take the city at any time with his fleet alone.

On the contrary, there was a statement that the honor of Spain required that there should be resistance, and that under the Spanish army code their

officers surrendering without resistance or giving a parole would subject themselves to trial by court-martial. Accordingly, we were fired on from the trenches and back through the streets of the city.

We could take the city with the fleet without losing a man, and yet our boys—boys from Dakota, boys from the West—were marched up and sacrificed and shot down to gratify Spanish pride; so that these Spanish officers would not be court-martialed after we paroled them. That is the statement of General Anderson. It is but a chapter in this wretched business.

Then he goes on to the subject of controversy. I propose to relate just briefly right here how Manila was taken. The city was surrounded with earthworks and an army of Filipinos from shore to shore. We landed on the western side of the city upon the shore, having previously secured from the Filipinos permission to occupy a quarter of a mile of their trenches. Aguinaldo asked that this permission be requested in writing, so that his authority and rights would be on record. Our officers promised to put it in writing. Depending upon their honor, Aguinaldo surrendered his trenches—a quarter of a mile of them—to our forces, and they occupied them.

I should like to ask whether that written request was ever sent. It does not appear in the documents sent to us. It does not appear in any record sent to us. Undoubtedly it never was sent. It was another piece of treachery practiced by our army over there. When I make this charge of treachery I draw it as an inference from the facts I state, and if it is not a just inference then people have a right to differ with me.

We landed our army on the strip of coast. Intrenchments running back from the sea, 14 miles around, were occupied by Filipino troops and then we ordered the assault—I mean this play at an assault. We started our forces down along the beach to the corner of the walled city. The wall was covered with armed Spaniards. When we got down there they did not fire upon our troops. We were in between the Spanish troops who had occupied Paco, a suburb of Manila, and Aguinaldo had driven them out, a thousand of them, and they had started for the walled city and they met our troops. We did not stop them. We had no fight with them. They were allowed to go into the walled city. General Anderson got notice that representatives of our commanding officers were inside the city receiving the surrender. Then he says he rushed his troops up along the wall to take possession of the bridges, so as not to let the Filipinos get into the Spanish city and injure and harm those poor Spaniards whom we supposed we were fighting.

But Aguinaldo assaulted all along the line, 13½ miles. Do you think he would have given us possession of his earthworks but for the fact that he expected to work with us? He lost many men. He took of the city of Manila more than we did. Outside of the wall is the principal part of the city, and he took those parts of the suburbs. He took them at the cost of lives. He took them at the loss of many of his men. When he came to the walled city, he found not the Spaniards resisting his course, but the bayonets of the troops of the United States. He found his ally turned against him. From that day on our course was one of constant aggression, constant irritation, constant attack upon him. Seven or eight officers of his army were killed by our sentinels. We pushed our sentinels out beyond the boundaries of Manila, out beyond the boundaries of the country we had a right to occupy.

Late in the fall Aguinaldo objected. He said: "I occupy Pandanan and Santa Mesa, and General Merritt has admitted that they are not within the boundary of Manila." Otis replied, "You are right. I have also examined the maps of Manila, and these places are not within the boundary. I can find no Spanish decree that places them within the boundary of Manila, but I am going to take them anyhow." That was the substance of his statement.

Aguinaldo's letter had recited what towns were not and what towns were within the boundary of Manila. The protocol stated that we were to keep possession of the city, bay, and harbor of Manila. Otis replied to Aguinaldo that the protocol said that we must keep possession of the city, suburbs, and defenses of Manila, and that because of that provision in the protocol we were obliged to compel him to move back.

Now, Mr. Otis stated what was absolutely false, and he discredits himself again. I should like to have any Senator read the protocol and then read Mr. Otis's report, on pages 20 and 21. He lied as to the area of country that we had a right to occupy. He did it purposely, and then he had to admit that even on that statement he was not entitled to the occupation of Pandanan and Santa Mesa. He did occupy them. He was at Santa Mesa, more than a mile beyond the boundary where we had a right to be under the protocol, violating the protocol with Spain by occupying territory beyond the boundaries agreed upon.

TERMS OF PROTOCOL OF AUGUST 12, 1898.

ART. 3. The United States will occupy and hold the city, bay, and harbor of Manila pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace, which shall determine the control, disposition, and government of the Philippines.

The fighting commenced, and we commenced the fighting. Now, let us see what Anderson says about that:

The origin of our controversies and conflicts with the Filipinos can, as already explained, be traced back to our refusal to recognize the political authority of Aguinaldo. Our first serious break with them arose from our refusal to let them cooperate with us.

We sent for him, brought him from Singapore on our vessel, and had given him arms, anxious to have him cooperate with us.

About 9 o'clock on the evening of August 12 I received from General Merritt an order to notify Aguinaldo to forbid the Filipino insurgents under his command from entering Manila. This notification was delivered to him at 20 minutes past 10 that night. The Filipinos had made every preparation to assail the Spanish lines in their front. Certainly they would not have given up part of their line to us unless they thought they were to fight with us.

We had got possession, we were in their trenches, pretty close to the wall of the old or Spanish town, and we got possession by lying to them, because Anderson refused to answer, and said he could not answer; and then also said that he was the bearer of the news to Dewey that we were going to conquer and keep that country.

They therefore received General Merritt's interdict with anger and indignation. They considered the war as their war, and Manila as their capital, and Luzon as their country.

That is what our forefathers thought as to this country.

Knowing that they would disregard any remonstrance on our part, I sent a battalion of North Dakota Volunteers to hold a bridge they would have to cross if they followed us into Manila when we made our assault on the next morning, but when the battle began they broke in by way of Santana and got into the city as soon as we did. After the white flag was raised and the firing ceased, it was found that fully 4,000 armed insurgents had taken possession of Paco and part of Malata, two important suburbs on the south of the Pasig. To hold them within these limits and stop any attempt at looting, a cordon of troops was thrown around them.

It has been said that a letter has been discovered in which Aguinaldo claimed a part of the share of the spoils of war, and therefore that has been claimed as justification for the statement that he was going to loot Manila. What he claimed his share of was what has heretofore always been considered legitimate spoils of war. That was the \$900,000 of public money which was captured when the city fell. That he would not have looted, that he would not have burned and destroyed, is proved conclusively by the fact that nearly the entire population of the city of Manila were of his race and tribe, and fully half of his army were recruited in that city, and their families were living there. They were not permitted even to go in to see their families.

The situation was exceedingly critical. Our soldiers believed that the Filipinos had fired on them, and the Filipinos were almost beside themselves with rage and disappointment. The friendly relations we had with Generals Recati and Morial alone prevented a conflict then and there. At 7 o'clock I received an order from General Merritt to remove the Filipinos from the city. Had we attempted to use force we would have had to fight to carry out our orders. In that event we would certainly have had a serious complication.

The Filipinos would have been justified in fighting right there, before our army was increased. They had been shown that we proposed to conquer their country, and still they forebore.

With 10,000 men we would have had to guard 13,300 Spanish prisoners and to fight 14,000 Filipinos. I therefore took the responsibility of telegraphing Aguinaldo, who was at Bacoar, 10 miles below, requesting him to withdraw his troops, and intimating that serious consequences would follow if he did not do so. I received his answer at 11, saying that a commission would come to me the next morning, with full powers. Accordingly the next day Señors Buencomeno, Lagarde, Araneto, and Sandecocame to division headquarters in Manila and stated that they were authorized to order the withdrawal of their troops if we would promise to reinstate them in their present positions on our making peace with Spain.

If that was not a reasonable request I should like to know how one could be made.

Thereupon I took them over to General Merritt. Upon their repeating their demands, he told them he could not give such a pledge, but that they could rely on the honor of the American people. The general then read to them the proclamation he intended to issue to the Filipino people. The commission then went back to Aguinaldo for further instructions. A member of the commission had brought me a letter from Aguinaldo, complaining that he had been harshly treated, and that his army had given up a part of their lines to us on the understanding that there was to be a cooperation between us in future military movements. I showed this letter to General Merritt after the commission had withdrawn. He directed me to reply that if Aguinaldo had been apparently harshly treated, it was from a military necessity, and that while we might recognize the justice of their insurrection, it was thought judicious to have only one army in Manila at one time.

On the 15th the commission returned with a paper containing ten unreasonable demands. There was an astonishing change, from one very reasonable condition one day to ten aggressive demands the next.

Their one reasonable demand had been denied.

The change can only be accounted for on the theory that Aguinaldo and his counselors plainly perceived from General Merritt's proclamation that we intended to hold the Philippines under military rule. Upon this they determined to obtain the best conditions for themselves at once. There was subsequently ample confirmation of this, from the fact that General Otis suppressed that part of the President's letter (December 24, 1898) to the Secretary of War which directed our military forces to take possession of all the Philippine Islands by right of transfer from Spain and by right of conquest.

This, mark you, is Anderson's statement, the man who took Manila, who was in command of our forces. He said that Otis struck out of the President's proclamation to the people those words because he thought they would create trouble, claiming the

right to the island by transfer and by right of conquest. What had we conquered? The city of Manila had been surrendered to us upon an agreement. We had not conquered another foot of the territory of the island. All the rest of the island had been conquered by the insurgents, and the Spanish power absolutely destroyed; and yet he claimed the islands by conquest. We have been trying since to enforce our title. But it is said that the title came more from God than from Spain. If that is true, it is expensive business clearing up the abstract.

There is a great diversity of opinion as to whether a conflict with the Filipinos could not have been avoided if a more conciliatory course had been followed in dealing with them. I believe we came to a parting of the ways when we refused their request to leave their military force in a good strategic position on the contingency of our making peace with Spain without a guarantee of their independence. From what was known of the situation, our Government was justified in not recognizing Aguinaldo's authority as a *de facto* government. For, even if it had been determined to recognize an independent Filipino government, it did not follow that we should recognize a self-appointed junta as constituting a government.

I beg leave to quarrel with that statement of General Anderson's, and I have a right to do it, because we brought Aguinaldo from Singapore on our vessel, and, advising with Admiral Dewey, he formed a government, the government which we helped to set up. Therefore it was the very government we were bound to recognize, the very element we ought to recognize to-day.

On the other hand, the dicta of international law that, in war, the powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme, and immediately operate upon the political conditions of the inhabitants—which the President made the basis of his instructions to General Merritt—could only be made to apply to the Philippines by a very liberal construction.

Let us see what Anderson goes on to say:

Was Luzon a conquered country? We held Manila and Cavite. The rest of the island was held not by the Spaniards, but by the Filipinos. On the other islands the Spaniards were confined to two or three fortified towns.

"The rest of the island," mark you, every acre of it, was in the hands, according to General Anderson, of the Filipinos; cities and towns, with populations of twenty and twenty-five thousand, all in the hands of the Filipinos, not of the Spaniards.

On the other islands the Spaniards were confined to two or three fortified towns.

On all the other islands in the group the Spanish power was destroyed. Iloilo was one of those other towns, on the island of Panay, with a population of 40,000 people, and before the treaty with Spain was consummated the Filipinos were in possession of that city administering its government.

At the time referred to we could not claim to hold by purchase, for we had not then received Spain's quitclaim deed to the archipelago. Making allowance for difference of time, we took Manila almost to the hour when the peace preliminaries were signed in Washington. But, no matter when Manila was taken, it was unfortunate for us that we felt so bound by the meshes of diplomatic amenities as to permit Spain's insurgent subjects to levy war against us and attack us when they felt fully prepared—a philanthropic policy which has cost us many valuable lives.

To return to the question of conciliation, one of Aguinaldo's commission, who was subsequently a member of his cabinet, said to me: "Either we have a *de facto* government or we have not. If we have, why not recognize the fact? If not, why have you recognized us at all?"

Pretty good logic; pretty hard to meet. All the sophistry of the Senator from Wisconsin never touched this case. I wondered when I heard it why he admired Otis until I read Otis's reply to a dispatch of a few days ago asking him if Aguinaldo had not sent a request, after the fighting commenced on the 4th of February, to cease the conflict. Otis went all around that, but did not deny

it, and so the Senator from Wisconsin did in his entire speech. His admiration for Otis must have resulted from the excellent example of how to get around the facts which Otis had furnished him.

This last remark referred to General Merritt's conceding them the control of the Manila waterworks and to General Otis's attempts to negotiate with them without committing himself.

There were other causes of antagonism. Our soldiers, to get what they considered trophies, did a good deal of what the Filipinos considered looting. A number made debts which they did not find it convenient to pay. They called the natives "niggers," and often treated them with a good-natured condescension, which exasperated the natives all the more because they dared not resent it.

So this is the report of General Anderson with regard to the capture of Manila and the situation over there, which must condemn before the civilized world forever the conduct of this Administration as the blackest and most infamous that ever was placed upon the pages of history.

I am going to read, although I think it is not in the consecutive order of my remarks, from page 424 of Document 62:

Memoranda concerning the situation in the Philippines on August 30, 1898, by General Green.

General Green was over there. This was made to the Paris peace commission for the purpose of furnishing our commissioners with information.

Green says:

The United States Government, through its naval commander, has to some extent made use of them for a distinct military purpose, viz, to harass and annoy the Spanish troops, to wear them out in the trenches, to blockade Manila on the land side, and to do as much damage as possible to the Spanish Government prior to the arrival of our troops; and for this purpose the Admiral allowed them to take arms and munitions which he had captured at Cavite, and their ships to pass in and out of Manila Bay in their expeditions against other provinces.

Webster says an ally is "anything associated with another as a helper, an auxiliary;" and the Century Dictionary says an ally is "an auxiliary, a friend." If they were not allies, and if the record does not stamp the statement of Dewey that he never made allies of them as untrue, then I am unable to understand the English language.

I am now going to read an account of the first fight. This is by a Colorado soldier, Mr. Abram L. Mumper:

The Filipinos who did enter the city August 13, 1898, were ordered out a month later. They obeyed the order, but formed upon the luneta and marched past and saluted the spot where these patriots died. As that bare-foot army of men and boys marched past our barracks one of their bands, to show good will toward us, struck up A Hot Time in the Old Town, our national air for the Philippines, made such by the Colorado band playing it as they entered the city August 13—an air every Filipino boy in Manila could whistle a week after we were in the city. We gave them a rousing cheer. They answered, "Vive los Americanos." No, they did not want to fight us. We did not want to fight them, and if we had to fight it was because the master magician in this drama, behind the screens, by some trick of the black art, brought us together.

You have heard much of Filipino taunts and insults. But we were the aggressors. We first turned the cold shoulder the 13th of August. Then followed in a succession, made more aggravating by the time that intervened, the order to evacuate Malate and Paco; the order for insurgents to quit Singalong and Paudacan. Dewey seized their boats upon the bay; then General Otis sends a map to Aguinaldo and notifies him to remove his forces beyond a line he marked. Disputes along the outposts are settled invariably against the natives. Each time we soldiers are ordered under arms ready to fight if they failed to yield, and judging from the talk you might have concluded that fight was preferred. But each time they yielded. Aguinaldo counseled peace. He trusted to the Peace Commission, and finally the Senate, to recognize his claims. He knew he would sacrifice everything by pursuing the other course.

The order of the President establishing sovereignty over the islands greatly excited the natives. Hundreds quit their stands. Carrimetto drivers passed through our lines to join Aguinaldo's army, and it became next to impossible to hire a carrimetto. So we soldiers had to walk. I was in town the day the President's proclamation was posted. I heard Filipinos who had trusted us till now say we were "No more amigo." I saw this proclamation, which you will remember says so much of the rights of property, torn down by the Filipinos and another put up by them that dealt more with the rights of man. A little later—January 21—a Filipino captain was shot down by an American sentry at the Tondo bridge. I never heard of any cause. It was already the seventh or eighth insurgent shot down in passing our lines. The command "Halt" given in English was often misunderstood, and though most of our soldiers were humane, there were a few that would as soon kill as eat, and were thirsting for their man. The press encouraged this reckless work by making a hero of the man that did the killing. Back of the press, judging from the full-page advertising, stood the beer kings, and upon the ocean were ships loaded with their beer. Trade was following the flag, and the flag must be advanced to make more room for trade. In the very ashes of the cities we burned—

Mr. BEVERIDGE. What cities does he say we burned?

Mr. PETTIGREW. He does not give the names. We burned, according to the stories, some of the cities. I have talked with soldiers about it. This man does not give the names of the cities. As a matter of fact, I talked with several of the South Dakota boys, and they said the soldiers themselves set cities on fire; that when fighting first commenced the intention was to make the situation so unbearable and so intolerable that the Filipinos would yield, and we did the burning as a part of that policy. That is the testimony of the soldiers with whom I have conversed. But afterwards when it was found that our inhumane policy was not bringing the desired results the order was changed. The men were furnished with matches with which to perform their incendiary tasks under the original plan of warfare.

When this captain was killed the insurgent newspapers called for war. The Filipino women of Cavite held a mass meeting and begged to be allowed to serve upon the firing line. Aguinaldo again quiets the rising storm. But the armies are approaching a clash. Both forces are becoming impatient under restraint. But a spark is needed. The authors of the drama look on, no doubt, in pious grandeur and say, "It is well."

The Nebraska regiment had been sent out to Santa Mesa. Aguinaldo had vigorously protested against this and pointed out to General Otis that Santa Mesa was outside the line of the protocol. General Otis looks it up and admits to Aguinaldo that such is the case (pages 20 and 21, General Otis's report), but holds fast to the position. Here, outside the limits of the protocol, in an effort to make the insurgents move back a sentry post, the first shot was fired. Grayson, the man who fired that shot, told me, on board the *Hancock*, as his regiment was ready to sail for America, that it was "the damn bullheadedness of the officers in invading insurgent territory" that was responsible for that shot. But we fired the second shot and third shot before we got a response. And this was two days before the Senate was to vote upon the peace treaty, and many of the insurgent officers away from the firing line! This is the way the insurgents made what the President calls a "rout attack" upon us. But the Filipinos returned the fire and the war was on.

The fact of the matter is that General Otis's report says that the insurgents were not ready. They did not intend that war should commence then. He says the battle was one continuous attack on our part and simple defense on theirs. It was aggression on our part. Furthermore, it is well proved that firing did not commence all along the line. Several minutes elapsed between the killing of the first and the killing of the second Filipino. It took an hour and a half for the firing to reach the length of our line, showing that they were not ready and did not intend to fight. Aguinaldo says they did not intend to fight. His officers were in the city. They had been given a holiday. I will not read his statement of this fact, but I will read the words Otis used:

The battle of Manila, which commenced at half past 8 o'clock on the
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evening of February 4, continued until 5 the next evening. * * * The engagement was one strictly defensive on the part of the insurgents and of vigorous attack by our forces.

I supplement that with the statement which I made orally, which is copied from the RECORD.

PROTOCOL OF AGREEMENT, AUGUST 12, 1898.

ART. 3. The United States will occupy and hold the city, bay, and harbor of Manila, pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace, which shall determine the control, disposition, and government of the Philippines.

Now, Mr. President, the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. SPOONER] complained that we raised the issue of imperialism and he objects that it shall be raised at this time. He says it is a political issue; that we have trumped it up and have undertaken to charge it against the Administration for political purposes. Mr. President, we did not raise the issue of imperialism. Who raised the issue of imperialism? The men who in sending our flag to Porto Rico refused to send our Constitution there. Who raised it before that? Every acquisition of territory that we have ever made up to the time we took Hawaii and the Philippines has contained a provision that the ceded territory should be incorporated into the Union of States and its inhabitants made to share with us the duties of a republic.

Mr. HANSBROUGH. Mr. President—

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. ALLEN in the chair). Does the Senator from South Dakota yield to the Senator from North Dakota?

Mr. PETTIGREW. I yield to the Senator.

Mr. HANSBROUGH. The Senator should except Alaska in that statement.

Mr. PETTIGREW. I will read the provision with regard to Alaska. After we had adopted the Spanish treaty we first voted down the Bacon resolution and then we voted this resolution:

Resolved, etc., That by the ratification of the treaty of peace with Spain it is not intended to incorporate the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands into citizenship of the United States, nor is it intended to permanently annex the said islands as an integral part of the territory of the United States.

There is your doctrine of imperialism. By it we propose to hold a people against their will as a colony of this Republic—a one-man power, absolute despotism government under the resolution. After bringing in that resolution the Senator from Wisconsin complains that we raise the issue of imperialism. You raised it when you said we will take and hold that country without promising to its people citizenship or ever making it an integral part of the territory of the United States.

Now, let us see. When we annexed Alaska the treaty contained the following provision:

The inhabitants of the ceded territory, according to their choice, reserving their national allegiance, may return to Russia within three years, but if they should prefer to remain in the ceded territory they, with the exception of uncivilized native tribes, shall be admitted to the enjoyment of all the rights, advantages, and immunities of citizens of the United States, and shall be maintained and protected in the free enjoyment of their liberty, property, and religion.

What are the rights, advantages, and immunities of citizens of the United States? Why, participation to the fullest extent in our Government and as understood and practiced in all our Territories admission as States. But the Philippines were not to have that. They were never to become citizens of the United States. It is not intended to incorporate the inhabitants of the

Philippine Islands into citizenship of the United States. So the Senator is answered with regard to Russia and Alaska.

Now with regard to Louisiana:

That the inhabitants of the ceded territory shall be incorporated in the Union of the United States, and admitted as soon as possible, according to the principles of the Federal Constitution, to the enjoyment of all the rights, advantages, and immunities of the citizens of the United States—

“Rights, advantages, and immunities!” The same words exactly are used in the treaty with Russia with regard to Alaska—and in the meantime they shall be maintained and protected in the free enjoyment of their liberty, property, and the religion which they profess.

Words absolutely the same except the promise that they should be admitted into the Union of the United States. They are superfluous words if used in connection with the pledge, with the contract that they shall enjoy all the rights, privileges, and immunities of citizens of the United States.

In the treaty when we purchased Florida there is the present provision:

The inhabitants in the territories which His Catholic Majesty cedes to the United States by this treaty shall be incorporated in the Union of the United States as soon as may be consistent with the principles of the Federal Constitution, and admitted to the enjoyment of all privileges, rights, and immunities of citizens of the United States.

In the treaty with Mexico, the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, Article VIII is as follows:

Mexicans now established in territories previously belonging to Mexico, and which remain for the future within the limits of the United States, defined by the present, shall be free to continue where they now reside, or to remove at any time to the Mexican Republic, retaining the property which they possess in the said territories, or disposing thereof, and removing the proceeds wherever they please, without their being subjected, on this account, to any contribution, tax, or charge whatever.

Then the treaty goes on to say:

The Mexicans who, in the territories aforesaid, shall not preserve the character of citizens of the Mexican Republic, conformably with what is stipulated in the preceding article, shall be incorporated into the Union of the United States, and be admitted at the proper time (to be judged by the Congress of the United States) to the enjoyment of all the rights of citizens of the United States, according to the principles of the Constitution; and in the meantime shall be maintained and protected in the free enjoyment of their liberty and property, and secured in the free exercise of their religion without restriction.

Then in the Gadsden treaty, where we purchased from Mexico a large portion of territory, there is this provision:

That all the provisions of the two articles of the Guadalupe Hidalgo treaty—

Just quoted—

and that the same articles should also apply to all the rights of persons and property, both civil and ecclesiastical, within the same.

So I fail to find a single instance where we did not provide that they should be citizens of the United States. Who then, I say, raises the issue of imperialism? Why, it is those who voted for the resolution declaring that those people should never be citizens of the United States, and that their country should never be an integral part of our Government; in other words, that they should never be admitted into the Union of States.

Who is apologizing, Mr. President, for the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States? Who is it that has suddenly discovered that the theories of government con-

tained in these great instruments are inapplicable to human affairs? Why, the Senator from Wisconsin and those who agree with him. The rest of us can read the Declaration of Independence on the Fourth of July, and we can hope that other people will throw off the yoke of despotism and tyranny and adopt our Constitution as a model of free government. But the imperialists, those who are apologizing for the Declaration, those who think we have outgrown the Constitution, of course can no longer hope that people anywhere in the world shall adopt our form of government as a model. We who disagree with this infernal imperial policy can vote for a resolution of sympathy with the struggling Republics of Africa, but the imperialists in this body can not. Such a change in their heart, such a change in their methods of thought, was never before heard of, outside of a miracle, in the history of the world.

Last Fourth of July Administrationists began to drift from their moorings, and could no longer celebrate that glorious day without apologizing for the document which it commemorates; but three years ago, after the campaign of 1896, when the great money power took control of this country and of its affairs, they could have read the Declaration and loved and praised it and wished that others would follow it as well as we can to-day. What they will do next Fourth of July I know not, but I am sure they can not read that Declaration with any heart or pleasure; and after they have done it, they must apologize to the listening crowds for their interpretation of it.

Who is it that is apologizing for Lincoln and asserting upon this floor that he fought the war of the rebellion to overthrow the fundamental position around which was woven his entire political life? Who is it that undertakes to say that the war of the rebellion was waged on his part to destroy the doctrine that all governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed? I say not those of us who are opposed to imperialism and aggression and robbery and wrong; but it is the Senator from Wisconsin, it is the imperialists of this body, who find it necessary to blacken the character of Abraham Lincoln. Let us see what Abraham Lincoln said about this. Lincoln said:

The Chief Magistrate derives all his authority from the people, and they have conferred none upon him to fix the term for the separation of the States. The people themselves can do this also if they choose, but the Executive, as such, has nothing to do with it. His duty is to administer the present Government as it came to his hands and to transmit it, unimpaired by him, to his successor. By the frame of the Government under which we live this same people have wisely given their public servants but little power for mischief, and have with equal wisdom provided for the return of that little to their own hands at very short intervals. While the people retain their virtue and vigilance no Administration, by any extreme wickedness or folly, can very seriously injure the Government in the short space of four years.

Here, then, Lincoln refutes the slander placed upon him. He says that this Government and the relation of the States and how they might be separated was only for the people to determine—the whole people—for the States to determine by an understanding or an agreement; that his duty was to carry out the doctrine around which his whole life centered—the doctrine of the Declaration of Independence.

Mr. HAWLEY. Will the Senator permit me to read a little from the Declaration of Independence, three or four lines?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from South Dakota yield to the Senator from Connecticut?

Mr. PETTIGREW. If only three or four lines, I am perfectly willing the Senator should read them; otherwise, not.

Mr. HAWLEY (reading)—

The good People of these Colonies, solemnly PUBLISH and DECLARE, That these United Colonies are, and of Right ought to be, FREE AND INDEPENDENT States; that they are Absolved from all Allegiance to the British Crown, and that all political connection between them and the State of Great Britain is, and ought to be, totally dissolved; and that as FREE AND INDEPENDENT STATES, they have full Power to levy War, conclude Peace, contract Alliances, establish Commerce, and to do all other Acts and Things which INDEPENDENT STATES may of right do.

Mr. PETTIGREW. Very good, Mr. President. I indorse every line of it, according to the spirit of the document itself, according to the ideas that all governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed. That document—the portion of it read—absolutely refutes the idea that any power is given to conquer other people and hold them in subjection. Let us see what Lincoln said:

Let us discard all this quibbling about this man and the other man—this race and that race and the other race being inferior, and therefore they must be placed in an inferior position, discarding our standard that we have left us; let us discard all these things and unite as one people throughout this land until we shall once more stand up declaring that all men are created equal. * * * I leave you, hoping that the lamp of liberty will burn in your bosoms until there shall no longer be a doubt that all men are created equal.

This was in Philadelphia, on his way to Washington to take the oath of office as President of the United States. He further said:

Your worthy mayor [of Philadelphia] has expressed the wish, in which I join with him, that it were convenient for me to remain in your city long enough for me to consult your merchants and manufacturers, or, as it were, to listen to those breathings arising within the consecrated walls wherein the Constitution of the United States and, I will add, the Declaration of Independence were originally framed and adopted. I assure you and your mayor that I had hoped on this occasion, and upon all occasions during my life, that I shall do nothing inconsistent with the teachings of these holy and most sacred walls.

I have never asked anything that does not breathe from those walls. All my political warfare has been in favor of the teachings that come forth from these sacred walls. May my right hand forget its cunning and my tongue cleave to the roof of my mouth if I ever prove false to those teachings. I have often inquired of myself what great principle or idea it was that kept this Confederacy so long together. It was not the mere matter of the separation of the colonies from the motherland, but that sentiment in the Declaration of Independence which gave liberty, not alone to the people of this country, but hope to all the world for all future time. * * * Now, my friends, can this country be saved upon this basis? If it can, I shall consider myself one of the happiest men in the world if I can help to save it. If it can not be saved upon those principles it will be truly awful. But if this country can not be saved without giving up that principle I would rather die than abandon it.

Yet Senators stand here upon this floor and say that Lincoln spent four years of his life and went to a martyr's grave to overturn that very principle. Then he goes on:

Those arguments that are made, that the inferior race are to be treated with as much allowance as they are capable of enjoying; that as much is to be done for them as their condition will allow—

He must have prophesied or seen in advance the speech that the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. SPOONER] was going to make, and the speech of the Senator from Indiana [Mr. BEVERIDGE] also, Mr. President—

what are these arguments? They are the arguments that kings have made for enslaving the people in all ages of the world. You will find that all the arguments in favor of kingcraft were of this class; they always bestrode the

necks of the people, not that they wanted to do it, but because the people were better off for being ridden.

To-day we revive the argument that those people are inferior, and that we have got to bless them with our presence and we have got to shoot civilization into them: that we have got to butcher them by tens of thousands in order to make them more happy, and then that we are going to send our missionaries to christianize them, when already the percentage of their people who are members of the Christian church is much greater than ours.

But this argument that the Constitution is worn out or out-grown and this argument that the Declaration of Independence is simply one of the nursery rhymes sung around the cradle of the Republic is not new. I read again from Lincoln. Lincoln, July 17, 1858, in a speech, made this statement:

Mr. Brooks, of South Carolina, in one of his speeches, when they were presenting him canes, silver plate, gold pitchers, and the like, for assailing Senator Sumner, distinctly affirmed his opinion that when the Constitution was formed it was the belief of no man that slavery would last to the present day. He said that "I think the framers of our Constitution placed the institution of slavery where the public mind rested, in the hope that it was in the course of ultimate extinction." But he went on to say that the men of the present age by their experience have become wiser than the framers of the Constitution, and the invention of the cotton gin had made the perpetuity of slavery a necessity in this country.

Why, Mr. President, I do not suppose that the advocates of imperialism or the doctrine of conquest, the burlesquers of the Constitution, the repudiators of the Declaration of Independence, had read that speech of Lincoln or had studied Brooks very much; yet they are not new, it appears, in their position. Brooks then thought that he had outlived the Constitution; the cotton gin made it necessary that slavery should continue; and here to-day the new interpreters of the Constitution and of the Declaration of Independence tell us that it is necessary to abandon those documents in order that we may conquer people in the interests of trade.

The gist of the argument of the supporters of the Administration is that we wish to extend our trade and commerce throughout the world. It is of interest in this connection to see what success we have had in the Philippines.

I hold in my hand the monthly summary of the commerce of the Philippine Islands for July, August, and September, 1899, prepared by the division of customs and insular affairs, War Department, Washington, D. C., Government Printing Office.

This pamphlet shows the total trade of the Philippine Islands for the three months stated herein: Imports, \$7,077,000 from all over the world. From the United States they imported \$331,000, or one dollar to every twenty of their imports came from the United States. I find by examining the different pages of this document that of the \$331,000 of trade with the United States \$110,300 was liquor. So, after all, if trade follows the flag it must be the liquor trade.

This certainly is not an encouraging prospect for the vast expenditure of life and money in order to conquer the Philippines and extend the trade relations of the United States. Three hundred and thirty-one thousand dollars out of an import trade of \$7,077,000, and \$110,300 of that was American liquor!

This cry that we are going to bless the Filipinos, this talk that we are there for their good and their happiness and their prosperity, is also old. It has been heard before. It is the plea of the

hypocrite. It is well personified in one of Dickens's works as follows:

Stretching forth his flabby paw, Mr. Chadband lays the same on Jo's arm and considers where to station him. Jo, very doubtful of his reverend friend's intentions and not at all clear but that something practical and painful is going to be done to him, mutters, "You let me alone. I never said nothink to you. You let me alone."

"No, my young friend," says Chadband, smoothly, "I will not let you alone. And why? Because I am a harvest laborer, because I am a toiler and a moller, because you are delivered over unto me and are become as a precious instrument in my hands. My friends, may I so employ this instrument as to use it toe your advantage, toe your profit, toe your gain, toe your welfare, toe your enrichment! My young friend, sit upon this stool."

Jo, apparently possessed by an impression that the reverend gentleman wants to cut his hair, shields his head with both arms, and is got into the required position with great difficulty and every possible manifestation of reluctance.

So it appears human nature is about the same whether in England or in Asia. But let us see. This doctrine that we are going to do them good, is older even than Dickens.

I have read McKinley's proclamation to the Filipinos, and I have put together the proclamation to the people of the Philippines and the proclamation of the King of Assyria, written eighteen hundred years before Christ. A man would think McKinley had plagiarized his proclamation from that.

Ragozin, in his history of Assyria, gives a literal translation of a proclamation issued by Asshurbanipal to the people of Elam. The Elamites had gone to war. No, their country had been invaded by Asshurbanipal's forces, he had overrun the land, cutting down the trees, filling up the wells, killing the inhabitants. He captured their capital city, killed their king, took 208,000 of their people into captivity as slaves, drove off most of the cattle of the rest of them, and then sent them this affectionate proclamation:

The will of the king to the men of the coast, the sea, the sons of my servants.

My peace to your hearts; may you be well

I am watching over you, and from the sin of your king, Nabubelzikri, I have separated you. Now I send to you my servant Belibni to be my deputy over you; I have joined with you, keeping your good and your benefit in my sight.

Mr. McKinley says to the Filipinos:

Finally, it should be the earnest and paramount aim of the Administration to win the confidence, respect, and affection of the inhabitants of the Philippines by insuring to them in every possible way the full measure of individual rights and liberty which is the heritage of a free people, and by proving to them that the mission of the United States is one of benevolent assimilation, which will substitute the mild sway of justice and right for arbitrary rule. In the fulfillment of this high mission, while upholding the temporary administration of affairs for the greatest good of the governed, there will be sedulously maintained the strong arm of authority to repress disturbance and to overcome all obstacles to the bestowal of the blessings of good and stable government upon the people of the Philippine Islands.

Mr. ALDRICH. Will the Senator from South Dakota yield to me to make a conference report?

Mr. PETTIGREW. I will finish in a minute, and then it can be made. I should like to finish, as it will take me but a minute.

How much like King George this reads. King George said:

I am desirous of restoring to them the blessings of law and liberty equally enjoyed by every British subject, which they have fatally and desperately exchanged for the calamities of war and the arbitrary tyranny of their chiefs.

This is what King George said to us when we rebelled. Here is another sample of how God is in all these things. We have done it to the glory of God and for the good of those people. How common it is for men, especially when they want to do mean

things, to undertake to silence their conscience by appealing to the Deity:

LOS ANGELES, CAL., June 10.

I am not given to talking about prize fights, and I fear the public will not understand me when I say that the Lord of Hosts was in the battle of last night. Like all other battles, this is a victory for our Lord and Saviour—

This is Jeffries's father after he had licked Fitzsimmons—

My boy won it because the Lord so willed it, and if he had been defeated it would have been through a power greater than we know of.

I supposed he won it because he outweighed Fitzsimmons and outfought him.

Thus reflected the preacher father of Jim Jeffries, the world heavy-weight champion prize fighter, when asked his opinion upon the results of the now celebrated contest. The fact can not be disguised that Mamma and Papa Jeffries, the big brother, and three sisters are supremely happy that the big boy won the battle, and that the possibilities of defeat have caused serious reflection. All day the curious, idle, and jubilant friends of the family have crowded around and about the Jeffries home in East Los Angeles.

Now, Mr. President, I wish to read simply an extract from Professor Creasy in his *Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World*:

There has never been a republic yet in history that acquired dominion over another nation that did not rule it selfishly and oppressively. There is no single exception to this rule, either in ancient or modern times. Carthage, Rome, Venice, Genoa, Florence, Pisa, Holland, and republican France all tyrannized over every province and subject state where they gained authority.

Mr. President, I believe that if this policy is continued there is no limit to its bounds; that if we can justify taking the people of the Philippines and governing them against their will, if we can justify conquering countries where our Constitution can not go, our armies will soon be seen marching across Mexico, down the Isthmus to South America, laying death and desolation in their track, rearing upon the ruins of those free governments a tyrannical, despotic policy, and when it is done our liberties will be gone.

Oh, you can not control this question in the United States without an immense navy and a standing army. You must have one man given supreme control of all, so that he can move with rapidity, so that decisions can be made in a day and armies marched and ships moved where danger is seen, and therefore despotism must be the result.

Mr. President, a republic and an empire can not exist under the same flag. No country should be brought within our bounds where our Constitution can not go, and no people should ever undertake to send their constitution to a country whose inhabitants have not the capacity and ability to maintain and support it.

Mr. PETTIGREW subsequently said: This afternoon I intended to ask to have printed as an appendix to my speech in regard to the Philippine Islands certain extracts from the reports of our officers with regard to the character of the people of the islands. There is no original matter whatever in it. Some of it is from newspaper correspondents, but most of it is official, from the officers of the Government, from the officials' reports, and from Document No. 62. I ask to have it printed as an appendix to my remarks.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there objection to the request made by the Senator from South Dakota? The Chair hears none, and the order is made.

The matter referred to is as follows:

APPENDIX.

CHARACTER OF FILIPINOS.

It may be well to quote Gen. T. M. Anderson in the *Chicago Times-Herald*: "As to the Filipinos themselves, I understand many erroneous impressions are current. I was in the Philippines until the latter part of March, having been sent there in June, 1898, in command of the first military expedition, and during that time I had some chance for studying the Filipino character and mind. I regard the Filipinos, such as have been carrying on operations against our forces in the island of Luzon, as being not far below the Japanese in intelligence and capability of culture. Nearly all can read and write; they have many schools, and there are a number of newspapers. Their cities are populous and well laid out and kept. There are many engineers and artists among the Filipinos."

Gen. Charles King is a close observer of people. He spent quite a time in the Philippines and fought the Filipinos, yet he wrote the following letter to the *Milwaukee Journal*:

SAN FRANCISCO, June 22, 1899.

To the Editor of the Journal, Milwaukee, Wis.

DEAR SIR: Thinking over your telegram and request of June 7, I find myself seriously embarrassed. As an officer of the Army there are many reasons why I should not give my "views of situation in the Philippines, how long fighting is likely to continue, and thoughts as to America's part in future of islands."

The capability of the Filipinos for self-government can not be doubted; such men as Arellano, Aguinaldo, and many others whom I might name are highly educated; nine-tenths of the people read and write; all are skilled artisans in one way or another; they are industrious, frugal, temperate; and, given a fair start, could look out for themselves infinitely better than our people imagine. In my opinion they rank far higher than the Cubans or the uneducated negroes to whom we have given the right of suffrage.

Very truly, yours,

CHARLES KING.

As to the government maintained by the Philippine republic, I shall quote from a letter of Lieut. Henry Page, of the United States Army, to the *Chicago Record*. It was written February 25, 1899. In it he says:

"When we reached the headquarters of Santa Ana another surprise awaited us, for here was found some of the machinery of Aguinaldo's government. Among the papers scattered about in confusion by the retreating officials were telegrams, letters, and commissions showing something of their system. One letter was from a township governor asking relief from his duties. A surgeon's certificate was inclosed. It had been forwarded through official channels to Aguinaldo's secretary of state and returned, with abundant indorsements, approved. With it was an order to the governor of the province to have a new election. Another letter was a complaint made against another local governor for maladministration. It stated the charges in real legal form and was duly signed. The numerous papers concerning school-teachers' appointments showed that the Filipinos had already perfected arrangements for the education of the youth on a large scale.

"I might also mention the deeds of property, records of births, deaths, etc., to show that Aguinaldo's organization is at least not a laughable farce. I might mention also meteorological and other scientific instruments and records to show that the Filipinos did not neglect science during those busy, warlike times. Letters dated February 4, from Malolos, showed that they had a good courier system. A book on tactics, engravings of the several uniforms, beautiful topographical maps, copies of the declaration of independence and the revolutionary constitution, military and state seals, and other articles all went to show that labor and intelligence were united in their production."

Notwithstanding the difficulties under which the Filipino government existed, how much inferior was it, as indicated by Lieutenant Page's letter, to our own Government? Was it the work of a people who need the guardianship of the United States?

In a letter to the Secretary of State Agoncillo said, on January 4, 1899:

"The Philippine Islands are in a state of public order. They possess a government satisfactory to their inhabitants, and are without an enemy within their borders offering any resistance to its just operations, and they find themselves to be at peace with all the world."

Every people, if left to themselves, will have as good government as they are entitled to, and they can not be given a better one. It is a novel doctrine that a remote people must have a government satisfactory to us. Since when

has it become essential that every weak people must have a government of our choosing?

CAPACITY OF FILIPINOS FOR SELF-GOVERNMENT.

Lieut. John D. Ford, United States Navy, of the *Olympia*, who left Manila May 9, 1899, interview in Baltimore:

"The Filipinos are of an intelligent, industrious character. The women are virtuous, more so, perhaps, than those of almost any other nation. It is believed by many that they are a very ignorant race, but such is not the case. There is hardly a man or woman, even in the middle class, who can not read and write. The children are given early education and are quick to learn. The half-savage Negritos are no more representatives of the Filipino race than our Indians are representatives of this great country. There are only about 100,000 Negritos in a population of between 7,000,000 or 8,000,000 Filipinos, and it is unfair for these people to be classed with them." * * *

Gen. Charles A. Whittier before peace commission:

"I went over the line of the only railroad in the Philippines, leaving one Saturday morning (in August, 1898) and going up 120 miles through the rice fields, a country of marvelous and most extraordinary fertility. The next morning we started out early and went up to Dagupan Bay, the terminus of the road. * * *

"At this time I was collector of the port, and during this time I heard all sorts of expressions, and I think I had a very fair opportunity—being amused with the natives and studying their peculiarities—to form a fair judgment. I stand a little isolated in my opinions, however, perhaps. Men so quickly dismiss the natives from their minds as simply 'niggers' and 'savages;' but when you think of all they have done you must give them credit for great capacity."

Edwin Wildman, United States vice consul at Hongkong, in the *Munsey*, April, 1899:

"Hundreds of natives speak English and thousands Spanish; some have been educated in Madrid and Paris. There are native assistants in the Manila observatory who handle the delicate instruments for measuring sound waves, registering seismic oscillations, determining the movements of atmospheric disturbances, and calculating weather prognostications. The richest man in the archipelago is a native. Native cures occupy many of the churches in the provinces. * * * Unquestionably there is good material in our new-found friend the Filipino, for it is inconceivable that he will decide to be our enemy; and the time is ripe for his development into a worthy and self-respecting member of the family of nations."

Capt. H. L. Wells, Second Oregon Volunteers, in October, 1898, witnessed a grand review of the army of the Republica Filipinos at San Fernando, and a ball, and of these he wrote in the *Pacific Monthly*:

"When I beheld the display of wealth, the bitterness of feeling of the planters against Spain, and their enthusiasm for the cause of liberty, I understood better than before how it had been possible for Aguinaldo to carry on the insurrection and maintain his army of barefooted warriors in the field. These rich, educated, and intelligent landed proprietors are the brains and sinew of the revolution, while the common herd, which is guided by them as absolutely as the populace of any country is managed by the aristocracy, is the bone."

Brig. Gen. Charles A. King, interview in *Catholic Citizen*, Milwaukee, after his return home:

"The Americans here do not realize the truth that nine-tenths of the people in the Philippines can read and write. Men have told me again and again that they can not credit it. I told those whom I met it was certainly so, and I have as authority the Jesuits, whose friendship I was fortunate in making in Manila, who are capital men and who assured me that this is so. You see the people are all Catholics, and their children are educated in the parochial schools. They have a good common-school education. There is no culture, excepting among the higher classes of course, but there is fair education everywhere; and many people have ability. The men in power whom I met are gentlemen, many of them scholars, educated abroad, polished in manners, perfect in courtesy, broad minded, and ripe in judgment. There is no reason in the world why the people should not have the self-government which they so passionately desire, so far as their individual ability to carry it on goes."

Letter of Admiral Dewey August 29, 1899, to peace commission in Paris:

"The population of Luzon is reported to be something over 3,000,000, mostly natives. These are gentle, docile, and under just laws and with the benefits of popular education would soon make good citizens. In a telegram sent to the Department on June 23 I expressed the opinion that 'these people are far superior in their intelligence and more capable of self-government than the natives of Cuba, and I am familiar with both races.' Further intercourse with them has confirmed me in this opinion."

"Panay, Cebu, Negros, and Leyte are very thickly populated and well cultivated. In these islands the natives are conceded to be the best educated and furthest advanced in civilization."

Lieut. Henry Page, U. S. A., in letter in Chicago Record, May, 1899:

"When we reached the headquarters at Santa Ana another surprise awaited us, for here was found some of the machinery of Aguinaldo's government. Among the papers scattered about in confusion by the retreating officials were telegrams, letters, and commissions, showing something of their system. One letter was from a township governor asking relief from his duties; a surgeon's certificate was inclosed. It had been forwarded through official channels to Aguinaldo's secretary of state and returned with abundant indorsement approved. With it was an order to the governor of the province to have a new election. Another letter was a complaint made against another local governor for maladministration. It stated the charges in real legal form, and was duly signed. The numerous papers concerning school-teachers' appointments showed that the Filipinos had already perfected arrangements for the education of the youth on a large scale.

"I might also mention the deeds of property, records of births, deaths, etc., to show that Aguinaldo's organization is at least not a laughable farce. I might mention also meteorological and other scientific instruments and records to show that the Filipinos didn't neglect science during those busy, warlike times. Letters dated February 4 from Malolos showed that they had a good courier system. A book on tactics, engravings of the several uniforms, beautiful topographical maps, copies of the declaration of independence and the revolutionary constitution, military and state seals and other articles all went to show that labor and intelligence were united in their production.

"Very naturally the whole Filipino structure is built upon the Spanish model. Their uniforms, like every detail of government, are copied more or less exactly. But the Filipino is an imitative little body. He is always anxious to learn new methods, and he masters them very quickly."

Provisional constitution, proclaimed June 20, 1898:

"ART. 2. As soon as the inhabitants of each town are free from Spanish domination, the most intelligent and capable of the people, distinguished by their intelligence, social position, and honorable conduct, both in the towns, villages, and provinces, shall assemble in open public meeting and there proceed to elect, by a majority of votes, a chief of the town, and also a head man or chief of each suburb or village, recognizing as such suburbs or villages not only those before as such, but as well the existing centers of population. All those inhabitants that possess the character stated in the conditions expressed, that are lovers of the independence of the Philippine Islands and have arrived at 21 years of age, shall have the right to compose this public meeting and be eligible for election."

Capt. Mark L. Hersey, quartermaster, Twelfth United States Infantry, interviewed in Boston Globe, August, 1899:

"Is Manila a good place for Americans?"

"For the capitalists, I should say yes. For the laboring man, no. Labor is too cheap. Why, you can hire the best of male servants for \$1 American money a month. There are vast coal fields there. American capital, aided by native labor, could produce coal at \$3.50 per ton, whereas it costs about \$17.50 per ton. The country is fertile beyond any standard we have in this country."

"What about the people?"

"They are far from being the ignorant men that they have been represented to be. They are not idol worshipers, but belong to the Catholic church, and are well grounded in the tenets of their belief. They are an intelligent people, a large part of them being able to read and write. In my army experience I have come in contact with the Mexican greasers and the Cubans. From what I saw and heard while in Manila I have no hesitation in saying that they are the superior of either of these people. They are men of education and refinement."

"Are they competent to govern themselves?"

"Well, the Mexicans have succeeded very well in that direction, and I see no reason why the Filipinos shouldn't, inasmuch as I believe them far more intelligent than the former."

"What sort of field is it for the missionary?"

"Well, they might just as well send them to convert the people of Spain. There is just as much chance to make converts."

Gen. Charles A. King, letter to Milwaukee Journal from San Francisco, June 22, 1899:

"The capability of the Filipinos for self-government can not be doubted. Such men as Arellano, Aguinaldo, and many others whom I might name are highly educated. Nine-tenths of the people read and write. All are skilled artisans in one way or another. They are industrious, frugal, temperate, and, given a fair start, could look out for themselves infinitely better than our people imagine. In my opinion, they rank far higher than the Cubans, or uneducated negroes to whom we have given the right of suffrage."

President Schurman, interview in Chicago, August 21, 1899:

"What sort of people are the Tagalos?"

"Well, most of them are Christians. They and the people of the Visayas and parts of the people of all the other islands of the Philippines are Catholics, converted to Christianity by the Spaniard. Some of those in Luzon are still barbarians. They have a heathen form of worship of the Malayan sort."

President Schurman interviewed in Omaha Bee, August 19, 1899:

"It will be a surprise to many Americans to know," said President Schurman, "that the educated Filipino is the equal to any other civilized people in the world. You may take their lawyers, doctors, artists, and educated businessmen and put them alongside of the same class of any other country, and they will equal them in mental capacity and in every attribute of citizenship. Great are the possibilities of these people and their country. They are quick to perceive the advantages of Western civilization; they are inspired by a hope to improve their condition intellectually and materially. Americans must deal gently with the Filipino. He is entitled to sympathetic consideration. There are many pleasing traits in his character; his home life is exemplary, and as a class he is well disposed toward his neighbor or his superior. Once his confidence is gained, if dealt with in a frank, straightforward manner, the misunderstanding will all be dissipated and the Filipino will realize that the American is his friend."

The Catholic World gives the following statistics of the church membership in the Philippines:

Under Augustinians.....	2,082,131
Under Recollects.....	1,175,156
Under Franciscans.....	1,040,753
Under Dominicans.....	650,851
Under Jesuits.....	213,065
Under secular clergy.....	967,294

Extract from a letter by Orman Osbon, of the First South Dakota, dated at Bacolor, Philippine Islands, August 31, 1899:

"There are in this town many wealthy people who were glad to see us come. Many in the States doubtless believe this country a wilderness and the people savages. I would like to take them into some houses here and see them stare. There is one gentleman here who formerly practiced in the Manila courts. While you might not expect him to be quite a savage, you would scarcely look for a fine Greek scholar in the jungles of Luzon; yet here is surely one. There is another family of musicians here. They have a very fine place, and I have spent some as pleasant evenings there listening to the piano, violin, mandolin, harp, and singing as I ever passed in my life.

"Señor Joven is a scientist quite up in modern electrical research. His house is lighted by an electric plant of his own manufacture. He was educated in Hongkong and Japan, and is a Freethinker. But the man I am most interested in is the principal of the schools, from whom I am taking instructions in Spanish. I go down at 3 o'clock and business begins. I teach him English and he teaches me Spanish."

Captain O'Farrell in the Irish World:

WASHINGTON, D. C.

Editor Irish World:

There are about 600 islands in the Philippine group, but there are only 11 of them large enough to merit consideration, viz: Luzon, Mindanao, Samar, Panay, Negros, Polonn, Mindoro, Leyte, Cebu, Masbate, and Bojol. Luzon, the largest of these islands, contains about 43,000 square miles—nearly equal in size to Virginia or Ohio.

The population has been estimated at about 10,000,000, but is not accurately known. We are indebted to the priests for census and maps of the islands.

The Sulu, or Mores, should not be confounded with the Philippine or Christian islands.

There are five Catholic bishops, with their respective dioceses, in which the members are enumerated as follows: The diocese of Manila, 1,817,445; Cebu, 1,748,872; Jaro, 1,310,752; Viga, 997,629; Camarines, 691,298, making a total of 6,565,998.

These people have their colleges, schools, churches, and convents throughout the islands.

There has not been a city or village captured by our army but had well-appointed separate schools for boys and girls, while the large cities have fine colleges and seminaries. Foreman, in his book on the Philippines, published by Scribner's Sons, 1899, says: "The teaching offered to students in Manila was very advanced. The curriculum in the Athenaeum embraced algebra, arithmetic, agriculture, commerce, commercial law, commercial geography, English, French, geometry, Greek, history, Latin grammar, Latin composition, mechanics, mercantile arithmetic, natural history, physics, chemistry, philosophy, painting, rhetoric and poetry, Spanish classics, Spanish composition, topography, and trigonometry.

"In the high school for girls the following was the curriculum:

"Arithmetic, drawing, dress cutting, French, geography, geometry, geology, history of Spain, history of the Philippines, music, needlework, physics, reading—prose and verse—Spanish grammar, sacred history.

"There are still higher colleges where students study theology and law."

Foreman further says: "The natives have an inherent passion for music. Musicians are to be found in every village, and there was scarcely a parish without its orchestra."

Of course we know that the people are mainly of the Malay race, and are divided into several tribes. They speak about twenty different dialects. The two greatest or most important divisions are the Tagals and the Visayans. It is stated that 70 to 80 per cent of the Tagals can read and write their own language, which, to their credit be it said, they have preserved, despite the efforts of the government to force the Spanish language upon them.

Magellan discovered these islands in 1521. England conquered them from Spain in 1762.

The natives under the leadership of General Anda, who was the Aguinaldo of that day, continued the war against the British for about two years, fighting over the same ground contested between Otis and Aguinaldo during the past six months.

In 1764 a treaty of peace was made between England and Spain, when the British withdrew. It appears that they were glad to get out of the place, as they failed to collect a ransom of \$5,000 which they levied on Manila at the time of its capture. I may also state here that a royal commission had previously advised Philip III, King of Spain, to abandon the islands because they were unproductive and costly. His Majesty declined on account of the salvation of the souls of the natives who had been converted.

The chief products of the islands are sugar, rice, tobacco, and hemp.

GENERAL REEVE'S TESTIMONY—SAYS DIFFUSION OF KNOWLEDGE AMONG FILIPINOS IS GENERAL—DOMINICAN UNIVERSITY WITH 5,000 STUDENTS—CONCILIATORY METHODS WOULD HAVE PREVENTED THE WAR—OTIS'S ARROGANT POLICY.

[From the San Francisco, Cal., Republican.]

When I was appointed chief of police of a city of 350,000 inhabitants I deemed it wise to ascertain as soon as possible something definite and to the point regarding the character, traits, disposition, and intelligence of the native population. Accordingly I sought the counsel of the leading English, Scotch, and German merchants. They told me that the Filipinos were intelligent, industrious, peaceable, and fond of home life. Personal investigation convinced me that the natives were engaged in all branches of industry. In the professions of law and medicine were many of the natives.

The best dentist in Luzon was an officer in Aguinaldo's army. In the field of mechanical and railway pursuits the Filipinos were active and promising. I was surprised to ascertain that the diffusion of knowledge was general. The percentage of natives able to read and write was large.

The enrollment of students in the San Thomas and Dominican universities and the attention paid to such branches of knowledge as law, medicine, liberal arts, and civil engineering excited my surprise.

Five thousand students were enrolled at the Dominican University. I mention these facts to dispel the impression that the Filipinos are ignorant and unlettered savages.

Throughout the provinces in the island of Luzon good common schools and high schools are maintained, the teachers being native priests.

In the provinces we found courts and schools established, and found local authorities administering affairs of government. Here was a system of collecting and disbursing the money so collected in the interests of the governed.

The disposition of the natives was that of extreme friendship toward Americans.

In the city of Manila the Filipinos, especially those who were wealthy, were anxious to remove the impression that they were ignorant of the requirements of modern life and the usages of civilization. They readily extended the hospitality of their homes to American officers of the military and civil service.

While I was General Garcia's guest I met an officer of the staff who spoke English fluently. Naturally the future of the islands was the topic of conversation, which brought forward the question whether the natives were capable of self-government. General Garcia's talk was interpreted. He favored a policy of permitting the natives to test their ability to govern themselves under the protection of the United States. The same sentiments were expressed by Aguinaldo.

General Reeve was asked if the bloodshed—the conflict of arms—could have

been averted by an intelligent policy of conciliation, and to the question he replied:

Conciliatory methods would have prevented the war.

General Otis's unfortunate proclamation of January 4 rendered conciliation almost impossible. He adopted the policy of ignoring the natives, of treating them as half civilized savages.

Now, we all agree to the proposition that the insurrection must be suppressed, but in the beginning a conciliatory course was not adopted.

No indication was given to the Filipinos as to the future intentions of the Government. In August, September, and October, immediately following the capture of Manila, the Filipinos kept inquiring what we were going to do, and our authorities replied, "We can not tell until the Paris Commission gets through." The Filipino would ask, "What will you do if you acquire the islands?" And still no hint was given to them by General Otis until it was too late. He ignored them completely. At every step of the peace negotiations he stipulated that nothing should be considered until the Filipinos laid down their arms. Herein is where the natives mistrusted the Americans. The Filipinos had many lessons from Spain in the folly of laying down arms. They were not able to comprehend the difference between Spanish and American promises.

ADMIRAL DEWEY'S GOOD OPINION OF THE FILIPINOS

Admiral Dewey entertains a high opinion of the industry and intelligence of the natives. He employed many of them at Cavite Arsenal, and spoke highly of them. The natives expressed great admiration for the Admiral. He holds to the opinion that the Filipinos are capable of self government, and, in my judgment, he firmly believes that the war could have been honorably avoided by an enlightened policy of conciliation in dealing with the natives. The Filipinos are much better fitted for independence and self-government than are the Cubans. It is my understanding that Admiral Dewey has on several occasions stated that the Filipinos were capable of self government, and that a wise policy of conciliation would have averted the war against the natives.

NAVAL PAYMASTER WILCOX FOUND A GOOD GOVERNMENT AND A HIGHLY CIVILIZED PEOPLE.

[Paymaster W. R. Wilcox, United States Navy, in the Independent.]

No doubt it is a misfortune that the Filipino does not understand American valor, and I dare say it is equally unpleasant that the average American does not know the true character of the natives of the Philippine Islands. Diplomacy could do much, and justice as we claim for ourselves could do more.

HOSPITALITY OF THE FILIPINOS.

I was fortunate in being allowed by Admiral Dewey to make a long journey through the island of Luzon; in fact, I covered the whole northern portion from Manila to Apari with the then Naval Cadet Sergeant, and in no country have I been treated with more kindly hospitality.

On reaching Aritao, the presidente local put us up in an old convent, and his band serenaded us at night, and in the morning everywhere the same generous kindness was shown. Our next stop was at Bambang, where the nephew of Aguinaldo met us some distance out of town, guns firing and convent bells ringing.

AGUINALDO'S POLISHED COURTESY.

In the evening a fine orchestra was stationed in the hall, and lulled two sleepy Americans to rest in sweetest strains, for almost all Filipinos can play some sort of music. In leaving this spot we were accompanied by soldiers, as usual, and by Aguinaldo himself, to Bayombong, capital of the province of Nueva Viscaya. I was met at the bank of the river by the presidente local, and we rode into town amid flags flying and the band playing, and were taken to the municipal building.

PEOPLE OF THE INTERIOR HIGHLY ACCOMPLISHED.

From this place our next important stop was Iligan, the capital of the province of Isabella, where millions of dollars come in annually to purchase the product of tobacco which is grown in this perhaps most fertile province in the whole of Luzon. On our first night in this inland capital we were given a dance, at which 50 well-dressed young ladies and the same number of gentlemen attended; I was sorry, indeed, I had not my dress suit. One young lady with whom I danced had a splendid gown of rare silk, handsomely embroidered, and she danced, I confess, better than I; she was a fine player on the piano, and sang many songs for us. The next night a theater was given, and

the players were quite as good as in some shows in a more pretentious country.

GENERAL LAWTON'S PROTEST.

Rev. Peter McQueen, of Boston, returned in August from the Philippines, and he reports Maj. Gen. Henry W. Lawton as saying:

"The Filipinos are a very fine set of soldiers. They are far better than the Indians. The latter never fight unless they have the absolute advantage. The Tagals are what I would call a civilized race. They are good mechanics, imitative—they manufacture everything. They have arsenals and cartridge factories and powder mills. They can manufacture everything they need. There is a rude arm they are getting the knack of making. Taking everything into consideration—the few facilities they have, the many drawbacks—they are a very ingenious and artistic race. And taking into account the disadvantages they have to fight against in arms, equipment, and military discipline, without artillery, short of ammunition, powder inferior, shells reloaded until they are defective, inferior in every particular of equipment and supplies, they are the bravest men I have ever seen. The Filipinos are not military by nature. They are rather domestic in tastes and habits, peace loving and industrious.

"Among the Filipinos there are many cultured people who would ornament society anywhere in the world—ladies who have studied and traveled; men who have had a good education and a fine brain. Take them as a class, there can as many of them read and write as the inhabitants in many places in America. As for their treachery, you would not have to come so far as this to find that. There is plenty of it in North America. All nations are treacherous, more or less. Some men and nations have treachery trained out of them more than others. What we want is to stop this accursed war. It is time for diplomacy, time for mutual understandings. These men are indomitable. At Baccor bridge they waited till the Americans brought their cannon to within 35 yards of their trenches. Such men have the right to be heard. All they want is a little justice."

[Hongkong Telegraph.]

THE FILIPINOS.

From the constantly growing crop of exploded stories concerning the moral turpitude and general worthlessness of the Filipinos, it is very evident that much of our previous information on the subject has been inspired by other motives than a desire to tell the truth about them. Our experience with the Cuba prevaricator seems to have been duplicated in the Philippines, and for this reason it seems particularly unfortunate that none of our consular officials in Manila or Hongkong, who from longer residence best understand their character, were sent to Paris along with General Merritt for the more complete enlightenment of our peace commissioners.

General Merritt's information and opinions concerning the military and naval situation at Manila, reinforced as they undoubtedly are by those of Admiral Dewey, were, of course, vitally necessary to the commissioners at this time. But it could not be expected that after an experience of but four or five weeks of army operations in and around Manila, he could furnish that variety and exactness of information concerning the natives that either Consul-General Wildman or Consul Williams is possessed of.

It is a somewhat significant fact that both of these civil officials, who have lived with and closely observed the Filipinos for several years, have a much higher opinion of them than do the all-wise and absolutely truthful press correspondents, with a few weeks' observation in a time of turmoil and revolution and a great desire to end a good "big story" over the cable to their papers.

The consuls, however, happen to be backed in their favorable opinion of the natives by Admiral Dewey and also by Prof. Dean C. Worcester, who spent nearly four years on the whole archipelago, engaged in his researches and collections as a naturalist, and who undoubtedly came in contact with more classes and varieties of the Philippine natives than any other white man who has ever visited them.

This is a part of what Professor Worcester has to say on this subject in the *October Century*: "The people of mixed blood and the civilized natives really constitute the bulk of the population, and for our present purpose may be treated as one class. In characterizing them I shall quote the opinion of a former British consul, not only because I agree with him, but because I wish to make plain the fact that my good opinion of them does not lack for confirmation:

"Rarely is an intratropical people a satisfactory one to eye or mind. But this can not be said of the Philippine Malay, who in bodily formation and men-

tal characteristics alike may fairly claim a place, not among the middling ones merely, but among the higher names inscribed on the world's national scale. He is characterized by a concentrated, never-absent self-respect; an habitual self-restraint in word and deed, very rarely broken except when extreme provocation induces the transitory but fatal frenzy known as "amuck;" an inbred courtesy equally diffused through all classes, high or low; by unflinching decorum, prudence, caution, cheerfulness, ready hospitality, and correct, though not inventive, taste. His family is a pleasing sight—much subordination and little constraint, liberty, not license. Orderly children, respected parents, women subject but not oppressed, men ruling but not despotic, reverence with kindness, obedience in affection—these form a lovable picture by no means rare in the villages of the Eastern isles."

This is, indeed, a very different story from those we have been hearing, and while Professor Worcester does not think the Philippine native is yet capable of complete self-government, does it not seem that by an entirely considerate, just, and humane leading hand extended from this great nation of ours he may ultimately become so, and make his country fit for a colonial union, at least, with the United States?—*Boston Times*.

FILIPINO CIVILIZATION, AS DISCOVERED BY A SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT OF THE MINNEAPOLIS TIMES AND UNITED STATES ARMY OFFICERS.

MINNEAPOLIS, July 19, 1899.

A special from Manila to the Times from its special correspondent contains the following:

Those who believed that the natives in the country districts were wild and untutored savages have been most agreeably surprised. The Tagalogs of central Luzon are by no means a barbarian people, even though their feet are uncovered and their right to bare arms has not been infringed. The Pampangese, or the natives of Pampanga province, are more refined in appearance, larger in stature, and more intelligent than their southern neighbors, the Tagalogs, and speak a different dialect. Every town has its church and school, and in almost every house the soldiers found books, well-written letters, and other evidences of intelligence and education.

The scrawny and measly-looking rabble that makes Manila hideous is not to be compared with the Filipinos of the country districts.

The Times correspondent took particular pains to inquire into the kind of government that had prevailed in the different towns during the régime of the Filipino republic. In Baliuag, the largest town captured by Lawton's flying column, President Marciano, a full-blood native, was directing affairs of local government in a manner highly satisfactory to the business men and other residents of the charming pueblo.

The 25,000 or 30,000 inhabitants of the town were amply protected in their personal and civil rights by a police force consisting of twelve picked natives. An apartment in the upper story of the large and magnificent church was used as a council chamber and a court room, where civil and criminal cases were tried. Serious crimes, however, are of rare occurrence among the natives.

When San Miguel was taken several prominent Filipino business men of the town remained behind, trusting to the generous treatment of the victorious invaders. Simon Teeson, president of the pueblo, had departed for the mountain districts with the majority. His residence was made brigade headquarters. Its interior decorations were superb, and bore high testimony to the skill of the native as a painter, a fresco artist, and a wood carver.

As General Lawton and Colonel Somers indulged in a game on the departed insurgent mayor's billiard table, they remarked that at home people were still of the opinion that the soldiers here were fighting savages armed with bows and arrows. Said Lawton: "No one would believe us over in the States if we told them of finding such luxuries as this in the 'wilds of the Philippine Jungle.'"

Simon Teeson had been mayor of San Miguel during the Spanish régime, but became an active spirit in the revolutionary councils at the time of the rebellion in 1896. Every native that the writer talked with at San Miguel was of the opinion that the Filipino government, both national and local, was satisfactory, and those who were informed on political events all expressed the belief that the present trouble would not have occurred had the Administration at Washington given the Filipino people a definite promise of independence, either immediate or future. The proclamation by General Otis, January 4, crushed their hopes, and they could not understand why the United States should not treat them in the same way as the Cubans. San Miguel has always been an insurgent hotbed, and its numerous wealthy natives have contributed large sums of money to the revolutionary cause.

After San Miguel, the next important town taken was San Isidro, in the province of Nueva Ecija. This place had been the capital of the Filipino

republic since the fall of Malolos, and here Aguinaldo and members of the cabinet and congress were well known.

Each day's developments are disclosing the base duplicity employed by the McKinley Administration in dealing with the Spanish-American and McKinley's private war in the Asiatic country. General Reeves, General King, Commodore Ford, Surgeon McQuestion, and many other Army and Navy officers who have returned from the Philippines, to say nothing of the scores of privates who have been discharged after nearly a year in that country, demonstrate beyond question that the Filipinos, the soldiers themselves, and the public generally, have been "flimflammed" for the past year completely by the "board of strategy" at Washington, ostensibly consisting of Alger, Corbin, and McKinley. Of course behind this body of war managers are the millionaire bondholders and franchise speculators who guide the acts of the public servants, and with the assistance of the Associated Press trust and secret news censor, news is manufactured and public utterances made by those in charge. Secretly the Government is being committed to entirely a different position.

The public has been given to understand that the Cuban people are being rapidly "christianized" and efforts made by our war managers to put them in condition for self-government from our American standpoint, while everything possible has been done secretly to disorganize and discourage them and give the world to understand they are treacherous and villainous in the extreme. Our space at this time will not permit us to give in detail the numerous dastardly outrages that are being perpetrated upon these people under the pretended guise of education, but every thoughtful citizen who has followed the trend of our national official managers knows the tableau behind the scenes will not bear the scrutiny of rigid public consciousness.

What is true of Cuba concerning the duplicity practiced through the connivance of the dollar-above-man speculators, aided by their willing tools in charge of governmental affairs, has been more than duplicated tenfold in the Philippine Islands.

The Spanish-American war was instituted by Congress in the interest of humanity, to free from industrial slavery what was supposed to be about 400,000 Cuban people who were not so well equipped for self-government as the 8,000,000 Filipinos, if Admiral Dewey is to be believed, yet from the very outset, early in 1898, the Administration was secretly conniving to change our form of government, fought for at Bunker Hill and Gettysburg, and adopt an imperial government under the pretense of expansion, which was to commit the 8,000,000 people to industrial slavery in the Philippine country.

Early in the summer of 1898, Maj. F. T. Green, of the United States Volunteers, was instructed to investigate the Philippine Islands and see whether our insurgent allies were in possession of that country, and if they were such people as were able to govern themselves, and also to report on the resources of the islands. On August 30, 1898, Major Green made his report (see Senate Document No. 62, Fifty-fifth Congress, third session) to General Merritt, and through him the War Department, and among other things said:

"In August, 1896, an insurrection broke out in Cavite under the leadership of Emilio Aguinaldo, and soon spread to other provinces on both sides of Manila. It continued with varying success on both sides, and the trial and execution of numerous insurgents, until December, 1897, when the governor-general, Preino de Rivera (Spanish), entered into written agreement with Aguinaldo. It required that Aguinaldo and the other insurgent leaders should leave the country, the (Spanish) Government agreeing to pay them \$800,000 in silver, and promising to introduce numerous reforms, including representation in the Spanish Cortes, freedom of the press, and the expulsion of secularization of the monastic orders.

"Aguinaldo and his associates went to Hongkong and Singapore. A portion of the money, \$400,000, was deposited in the banks of Hongkong, and a lawsuit soon arose between Aguinaldo and one of his subordinate chiefs named Archo, which is interesting on account of the honorable position taken by Aguinaldo. Archo sued for a division of the money among insurgents according to rank. Aguinaldo claimed that the money was a trust fund and was to remain on deposit until it was seen whether the Spaniards would carry out their promised reforms, and if they did not, it was to be used to defray the expenses of a new insurrection. The suit was settled out of court by paying Archo \$5,000. Aguinaldo is now using the money to carry on operations of the present insurrection."

This was Major Green's official report to the War Department at Washington, made August 30, 1898. It clearly showed the insurgent leaders were willing to be exiled from their country in order that the Filipinos might receive the benefit of the Spanish reforms promised. The same report also showed none of the reforms promised by the Spanish Government were given, and Aguinaldo had kept the money to prosecute another insurrection for the freedom of his countrymen from Spanish industrial slavery. So that when Admiral Dewey learned of the ability of the leading insurgents he was anx-

ious to cooperate with them in driving away the Spaniards, and he secured communication with General Aguinaldo in April, 1898, and assisted him with arms and munitions of war, giving him to understand his countrymen would be treated the same as Cuba and have their independence. With this state of facts and many more before the Administration, last winter they caused the report to be sent out that Spain had bought Aguinaldo off and that he was a mercenary and dishonest scoundrel, with no ability, and justly ought to be killed, in order that the Mohammedans might christianize the rest of the Filipinos.

DEWEY'S VIEWS.

In June, 1898, Admiral Dewey wired the Administration at Washington of the fitness of the Filipinos for self-government, and his sympathies were with the struggling insurgents in securing them their independence. Knowing the mercenary motives of the Administration managers, it was the most natural thing in the world for Admiral Dewey to cut the cable and keep the gang at Washington from having direct communication with him for several months. He was aware of the secret work of the Administration in their silent effort to prepare for the subjection of the Philippine Islands and making industrial slaves of these struggling Malays, and being a true American who had assisted in freeing 400,000 black slaves under our Declaration of Independence, he used his efforts to give the Filipinos their freedom.

Accordingly he prepared another telegram for the secret managers at Washington (see Senate document, No. 62, above referred to) with a view to aiding these Asiatic insurgents in securing their independence before the treaty with Spain was closed and we paid the Spanish bondholders the \$20,000,000 for their quitclaim deed for something they did not own. His second one read as follows:

"UNITED STATES NAVAL FORCE ON ASIATIC STATION,
"FLAGSHIP BALTIMORE, MANILA, PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, August 28, 1898.

"In a telegram sent the Department on June 23, I expressed the opinion that 'these people are far superior in their intelligence and more capable of self-government than the natives of Cuba, and I am familiar with both races.' Further intercourse with them has confirmed me in this opinion.

"DEWEY."

Is it any wonder that the hero of Manila should have become disgusted with the Washington commercial warriors who were prostituting the fundamental principles of this Government, and asked to be returned to the United States?

CONSUL-GENERAL.

In this same Senate document is more interesting correspondence which shows the agreement made with General Aguinaldo to secure his leadership in driving the Spaniards from the Philippines, even before Admiral Dewey destroyed the Spanish fleet.

Consul-General Pratt wired Washington officials as follows:

CONSULATE GENERAL UNITED STATES,
Singapore, April 28, 1898.

On the evening of the 23d instant, I was confidentially informed of the arrival here of the supreme ruler of the Philippines, General Aguinaldo, by H. W. Bray, an English gentleman of high standing, who, after fifteen years' residence as a merchant and planter in the Philippines, had been compelled by the disturbed condition of things resulting from Spanish misrule, to abandon his property and leave there, and from whom I had previously obtained much valuable information for Commodore Dewey regarding fortifications, coal deposits, etc., at different points in the islands.

Being aware of the great prestige of General Aguinaldo with the insurgents, and that no one, either at home or abroad, could exert over them the same influence and control that he could, I determined at once to see him, and at my request a secret interview was accordingly arranged for the following morning, Sunday the 24th, in which, besides General Aguinaldo, were only present the general's trusted advisers and Mr. Bray, who acted as interpreter.

I telegraphed the Commodore the same day as follows, through our consul-general at Hongkong:

"Aguinaldo, insurgent leader, here; will come to Hongkong and arrange with Commodore for general cooperations with insurgents at Manila if desired. Telegraph.

"PRATT."

The Commodore's reply regarding this:
"Tell Aguinaldo come as soon as possible.

"DEWEY."

I received it late that night and at once communicated to General Aguinaldo, who, with his aid-de-camp and private secretary, all under assumed

names. I succeeded in getting off by the British steamer *Malacca*, which left here on Tuesday the 26th.

E. S. PRATT,
Consul-General, Singapore.

"This Senate Document No. 62 gives the following further evidence of an agreement with Aguinaldo, which was wired to Washington:

SINGAPORE, May 5, 1898.

I regret to have to report that the circumstances attending the departure from here of General Aguinaldo to join Commodore Dewey, which I had endeavored so hard to prevent being disclosed, were, in substance, made public in yesterday's edition of the *Singapore Free Press*. The facts are, in the main, properly given.

E. S. PRATT,
United States Consul General, Singapore.

Senate Document No. 62 contains the article above referred to by the consul-general which appeared in the *Singapore Free Press*, and a part of it reads as follows, and was by Pratt said to be correctly given:

"The consul-general of the United States, coinciding with the general views expressed during the discussion, placed himself at once in telegraphic communication with Admiral Dewey, between whom and Mr. Pratt a frequent interchange of telegrams consequently took place.

"General Aguinaldo's policy embraces the independence of the Philippines, whose internal affairs would be controlled under European and American advisers. American protection would be desirable temporarily, on the same lines as that which might be instituted hereafter in Cuba."

This *Singapore Free Press* said the above were the arrangements with General Aguinaldo, and Mr. Pratt said that this was the agreement.

With these facts and hundreds of a similar character before the Administration at Washington for more than a year past, under the censorship of Government officials the public has been given a much different view of pretended existing facts. Who can expect the public to believe in this National Administration when the facts are plain that deception of the grossest character was practiced on the Filipino insurgents, and also on the patient people of the United States? The Journal will from time to time give its readers more of the duplicity of the national servants at Washington and elsewhere.

At this interview, after learning from General Aguinaldo the state of and object sought to be obtained by the present insurrectionary movement, which, though absent from the Philippines, he was still directing, I took it upon myself, while explaining that I had no authority to speak for the Government, to point out the danger of continuing independent action at this stage, and having convinced him of the expediency of cooperating with our fleet, then at Hongkong, and obtained the assurance of his willingness to proceed thither and confer with Commodore Dewey to that end, should the latter so desire, I telegraphed the Commodore the same day as follows through our consul-general at Hongkong:

"Aguinaldo, insurgent leader, here. Will come Hongkong arrange with Commodore for general cooperation insurgents Manila, if desired. Telegraph."

"PRATT."

The Commodore's reply reading thus:

"Tell Aguinaldo come soon as possible."

"DEWEY."

I received it late that night, and at once communicated to General Aguinaldo, who, with his aid-de-camp and private secretary, all under assumed names, I succeeded in getting off by the British steamer *Malacca*, which left here on Tuesday the 26th.

The General impressed me as a man of intelligence, ability, and courage, and worthy the confidence that has been placed in him.

A few days later Consul Pratt reported some conversations with Aguinaldo and closed with this:

"The General further stated that he hoped the United States would assume protection of the Philippines for at least long enough to allow the inhabitants to establish a government of their own, in the organization of which he would desire American advice and assistance."

In order to understand how this conference came about and the events leading up to it, Consul Pratt forwarded to the Department of State a clipping from the *Singapore Free Press* giving an account of the conference and some preliminary history, as follows:

"In order to understand and appreciate this interesting historical incident properly, it will be necessary to allude to the causes leading to the second rebellion in the Philippines, which was almost coincident with, though not instigated by, the strained relations between Spain and the United States.

"In December last General Primo de Rivera, who above all other Spanish generals has an intimate knowledge of the country and its inhabitants, found the position untenable for both parties. Neither of these had the remotest chance of terminating the rebellion decisively—the rebels secure in their mountain fastnesses, the Spaniards holding the chief towns and villages on the coast. Primo de Rivera therefore sent two well-known Philippine natives, occupying high positions in Manila, to propose terms of peace to General Aguinaldo in Biac-na-Bato. A council of the revolutionary government was held, in which it was agreed to lay down arms on condition of certain reforms being introduced. The principal of these were:

- "1. The expulsion, or at least secularization, of the religious orders, and the inhibition of these orders from all official vetoes in civil administration.
- "2. A general amnesty for all rebels, and guarantees for their personal security and from the vengeance of the friars and parish priests after returning to their homes.
- "3. Radical reforms to curtail the glaring abuses in public administration.
- "4. Freedom of the press to denounce official corruption and blackmailing.
- "5. Representation in the Spanish Parliament.
- "6. Abolition of the iniquitous system of secret deportation of political suspects, etc.

"Primo de Rivera agreed to these reforms in sum and substance, but made it a condition that the principal rebel leaders must leave the country during His Majesty's pleasure. As these had lost all their property or had had it confiscated and plundered, the Government agreed to provide them with funds to live in a becoming manner on foreign soil.

"The rebels laid down their arms and peace was apparently secured, but no sooner had they done so and returned to their houses than the intransigent religious orders commenced at once to again persecute them and trump up imaginary charges to procure their rearrest. The Spanish Government, on its side, imagining itself secure, desisted from carrying out the promised reforms, thinking another trick like that played on the Cubans after the peace of Zanjon, arranged by Martinez Campos, might succeed. The Filipinos however, with their business before them, refused to be made dupes of, and have taken up arms again, not alone in the immediate districts around Manila, but throughout the archipelago, which merely awaits the signal from General Aguinaldo to rise en masse, no doubt carrying with them the native troops hitherto loyal, and for which loyal service they have received no thanks but only ingratitude."

This brief account of the events leading up to the last rebellion against Spanish rule preceded the story of how General Aguinaldo and his men came to be in Singapore to consult with the Filipino leaders there and the narrative of the conferences between the Filipino leader and the representative of the United States. The article sent by Consul Pratt concluded with the following terse summing up of the policy of the Filipinos:

"General Aguinaldo's policy embraces the independence of the Philippines, whose internal affairs would be controlled under European and American advisers. American protection would be desirable temporarily, on the same lines as that which might be instituted hereafter in Cuba. The ports of the Philippines would be free to the trade of the world, safeguards being enacted against an influx of Chinese aliens who would compete with the industrial population of the country. There would be a complete reform of the present corrupt judiciary of the country under experienced European law officers. Entire freedom of the press would be established, as well as the right of public meeting. There would be general religious toleration, and steps would be taken for the abolition and expulsion of the tyrannical religious fraternities who have laid such strong hands on every branch of civil administration. Full provision would be given for the exploitation of the natural resources and wealth of the country by roads and railways and by the removal of hindrances to enterprise and investment of capital. Spanish officials would be removed to a place of safety until opportunity offered to return them to Spain. The preservation of public safety and order and the checking of reprisals against Spaniards would, naturally, have to be a first care of the Government in the new state of things."

THE PHILIPPINE CENSORSHIP—PRESIDENT M'KINLEY DETERMINED TO SUPPRESS DAMAGING TRUTHS ABOUT HIS WAR OF AGGRESSION—PHRASES WHICH, IT IS SAID, WAR DEPARTMENT SUPPLIES—"SITUATION IMPROVING," "REBELS DISINTEGRATING," "ENEMY ROUTED WITH GREAT SLAUGHTER," "BETTER CLASS OF NATIVES FRIENDLY," ETC.

[Special to the New York World.]

WASHINGTON, June 16, 1899.

The President is determined to continue to enforce the censorship of private and press dispatches at Manila. Within a few days he has intimated forcibly

to General Corbin that too much information is being made public from the War Department.

General Otis is in supreme authority over the Manila censorship, and it is not within the War Secretary's province to order its abatement.

NEWSPAPER CORRESPONDENTS WARNED.

Newspaper correspondents are forbidden by General Otis to file press reports from Hongkong, and are warned that if they evade the censorship by this method their "usefulness to their papers will cease immediately."

Colonel Thompson, the first press censor at Key West, is now in charge at Manila. In a private letter to an officer here Colonel Thompson writes: "My duties are exceedingly trying."

STEREOTYPED PHRASES WHICH IT IS SAID WAR DEPARTMENT SUPPLIES.

Authentic information regarding the true situation in Manila can not be obtained from the dispatches posted at the War Department. Advices regarding the situation are suppressed. It is said that the War Department officials go so far as to insert phrases in the official reports as given out. Among the favorite expressions of the official editors of the advices from Otis are: "Situation improving; rebels disintegrating," "Enemy routed with great loss," "Rebels routed; do not think will make another stand," "Better class of natives friendly to Americans."

The World correspondent is informed on high authority that the President himself not only approves this method, but has directed it, so that the public shall not get the truth from Manila.

FILIPINOS DANGEROUS FOES—ADMIRAL DEWEY'S FLEET ENGINEER SAYS IT WILL BE HARD TO CONQUER THEM.

BALTIMORE, June 15, 1899.

Commander John D. Ford, who was Admiral Dewey's fleet engineer, has returned to his home here from Manila.

"When I left," he said to the World correspondent to-night, "we did not hold quite as much ground as during the first of August last year, and our lines were restricted to the suburbs of Manila. The troops did push out into the country, but could not hold the ground they made by raids."

IT WILL TAKE IMMENSE ARMY TO CONQUER PHILIPPINES.

"It is impossible to conquer the people or to gain the islands without more troops. If we send a great many more and bend all our energies to doing it we can beat them and take the islands, but it would mean a great loss of life. As it is now it is all we can do to hold our own."

The line is always active and there is no relief. Men spend months in the trenches, subjected to great mental and physical strain and never knowing at what moment they may be assailed.

A LIBERTY-LOVING PEOPLE, FULL OF COURAGE.

The Filipinos pictured in the papers are not the men we are fighting. The fellows we deal with out there are not ignorant savages fighting with bows and arrows, but an intelligent liberty-loving people, full of courage and determination. Their courage is undoubted, and they fight to the death.

FILIPINOS HAVE A GOOD GOVERNMENT, WHICH OPERATES SUCCESSFULLY.

They are stronger, more determined, and more skillful in the art of war than when the fighting started, and they have 11,000,000 of people to draw from. They are armed with Mausers, the best rifle in the world, and are far better marksmen than the Spaniards.

They have a good government, which they are operating successfully, and preserve law and order. They certainly don't think theirs is a hopeless fight, and I don't think anyone else does who knows anything about it.

TO PLEASE ENGLAND—THAT IS THE REASON M'KINLEY DECIDED TO KEEP THE PHILIPPINES—CAPTAIN O'FARRELL FURNISHES FACTS—THE IMPERIALIST CHARGE OF BRIBERY AGAINST AGUINALDO A CALUMNY.

In last week's Irish World Capt. Patrick O'Farrell furnished some interesting facts concerning the educational status of the people of the Philippines. He also gave documentary evidence amounting to proof that the Filipinos were led to believe that they were allies of the United States against Spain, and that they welcomed Americans as deliverers who came to give them freedom and self-government. Captain O'Farrell concludes his letter as follows:

"It must not be supposed that it was Aguinaldo who organized the rebel

forces in Luzon, for long before either Dewey or Aguinaldo reached Cavite there was a strong rebel force threatening Manila. Aguinaldo's arrival encouraged and increased this force."

Our consul at Manila writes, March 19, 1898:

"Rebellion never more threatening to Spain. Rebels getting arms, money, and friends. They outnumber the Spaniards—residents and soldiery. * * *

"OSCAR F. WILLIAMS,
"United States Consul, Manila."

He sends another dispatch later on:

* * * "The Crown forces are now building a cordon of small forts on city's outskirts for defense against natives. * * * Eight thousand native insurgents are encamped only 5 miles away.

"OSCAR F. WILLIAMS,
"United States Consul, Manila, March 27, 1898."

(Note that this was five weeks before Dewey got there.)

Let us now turn from the Navy to the Army, and what do we find? General Anderson was the first general to assume command of our military forces in front of Manila. On July 4, 1898, he wrote as follows:

HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE, UNITED STATES FORCES.

Señor Don EMILIO AGUINALDO,
Commanding Philippine Forces, Cavite, Luzon.

GENERAL: I have the honor to inform you that the United States of America, whose land forces I have the honor to command in this vicinity, being at war with the Kingdom of Spain, has entire sympathy and most friendly sentiments for the native people of the Philippine Islands.

For these reasons I desire to have the most amicable relations with you and to have you and your people cooperate with us in military operations against the Spanish forces.

THOMAS M. ANDERSON, *Brigadier-General.*

HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE UNITED STATES FORCES, *Cavite Arsenal, Philippine Islands, July 19, 1898.*

Señor Don EMILIO AGUINALDO,
Commanding General, Philippine Forces.

GENERAL: The bearer, Maj. J. F. Bell, United States Army, was sent by Maj. Gen. Wesley Merritt, United States Army, to collect for him, by the time of his personal arrival, certain information concerning the strength and positions of the enemy and concerning the topography of the country surrounding Manila.

I would be obliged if you would permit him to see your maps and place at his disposal any information you may have on the above subjects, and also give him a letter or pass, addressed to your subordinates, which will authorize them to furnish him any information they can on these subjects, and to facilitate his passage along the lines upon a reconnaissance around Manila, on which I propose to send him.

I remain, with great respect, your obedient servant,

THOMAS M. ANDERSON,
Brigadier-General, United States Volunteers, Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE, UNITED STATES EXPEDITIONARY FORCES, *Cavite Arsenal, P. I., July 21, 1898.*

Señor Don EMILIO AGUINALDO,
Commanding General, Philippine Forces.

GENERAL: I have the honor to request that passes and such other assistance as practicable be given to the bearer, Lieut. E. J. Bryan and party, who are making a reconnaissance of the surrounding country. Thanking you for assistance given on previous occasions,

I remain, with great respect, your obedient servant,

THOMAS M. ANDERSON,
Brigadier-General, United States Volunteers, Commanding.

Any fair-minded man will see from the foregoing dispatches from our consuls, naval officers, and generals that we were in Luzon as the friends and allies of the Filipinos—especially as our declaration of war against Spain disclaimed any intention of land grabbing in Cuba. By a much greater force the "Teller" declaration should apply to the Philippine Islands on the other side of the globe.

MCKINLEY CHANGED HIS POLICY TO SUIT ENGLAND'S DESIGNS.

At first we did not intend to keep the Philippines. About the early part of June, 1898, the English papers began to publish articles urging the Americans to keep the Philippines. England became alarmed at the prospect of a republic being set up in the Orient. It would be like starting a prairie fire among her Malay subjects in Borneo, Singapore, Hongkong, and her other East India possessions. Hence President McKinley did not wish to start another Paul Kruger to set a bad example to the subjects of the Empress of India.

The London Spectator, on the Philippines, hoped the United States would keep them, saying: "The weary Titan needs an ally, and the only ally whose aspirations, ideas, and language are like his own is the great American people."

"By their action the government has recognized the false principle that Canada is obliged to assist the empire in its wars, which do not interest us. This principle is full of menace to us; it may bring us to civil war."

The vigorous opposition among French-Canadians to the dispatch of the contingent was very strikingly illustrated in this city when the members of the Montreal unit left to take the steamer at Quebec. Not a solitary bugle note sped the volunteers on their way; not a single member of the city council was present at the railway station to give an official aspect to the occasion; not a flag or streamer floated from any of the city buildings.

It was a different scene that Montreal presented some thirty years ago, when a contingent of papal zouaves, enrolled from among the French-Canadians of the Province, left to fight the battles of the Pope.

(See General Green's report, page 421, Senate Document No. 62.)

Aguinaldo is looked up to by his own people as a pure and unselfish patriot.

Our Government offered to bribe him with a commission in our Army, just as was done with the Sultan of Sulu and his chiefs, but he spurned the offered gift.

But it is said that we paid Spain for her sovereignty. Had Spain any sovereignty at the time we forced her to take twenty millions of our good American dollars? In the American Encyclopedia of Law, the doctrine is stated that "a state is sovereign when it has the supreme power of controlling its citizens or subjects."

I should like to ask what sovereignty Spain had at the time she sold out her interests to us.

The governor had previously "skedaddled" on a German ship, part of her army was besieged in Manila, and Aguinaldo had the rest of them in his possession as prisoners.

"WHAT SHOULD WE DO WITH THE PHILIPPINES?"

Almost nine out of every ten imperialists say: "I wish we never had gone down there, but now that we are there we should support the Administration until we conquer or exterminate them."

Here is Christian logic. We admit that we are wrong, but we should keep on doing wrong. What would the world say if we commenced to do right now? At war! Congress has not declared war. This is McKinley's war.

Congress should appoint a commissioner to go to Aguinaldo and say that the American people are and always have been his friends; that we are going to withdraw our armies; that all we want is a good harbor for a coaling station; that we will leave a few of our ships to keep our flag flying in the Philippines, so as to say to all the world, "Hands off!" Aguinaldo and his people can start a government of their own. We can remain as their allies and friends—not their protectors.

In a few years we would see a Philippine republic, with a new flag flying on the ocean's highway. A new republican nation born and brought forth by our efforts. We would then have a nation of friends, which would be much better, in every way, than a dominion of subjects who would be always our enemies.

PATRICK O'FARRELL.

WASHINGTON, D. C., —.

PRESIDENT AGUINALDO'S PROCLAMATION.

The following is a translation of President Aguinaldo's proclamation:

[Official.]

Manifesto issued by the President of the Revolutionary Government, To my brothers the Filipinos, and all accredited consuls, and foreigners:

The proclamation of his excellency General Otis, major-general of volunteers of the United States, published yesterday in the newspapers of Manila, obliges me to circulate the following manifesto in order to make known to

all those who can read and understand it that the present document is my solemn protest against all that is contained in the proclamation hereinafter referred to, because my conscience compels me to do so in fulfillment of my pledges to my beloved country and the special and official relations with the North American nation.

General Otis gives himself the title in the proclamation in question of military governor of the Philippine Islands. I protest once and a thousand times and with all the energy of my soul against such authority.

I proclaim solemnly that I have not promised, either verbally or in written document, either in Singapore, Hongkong, or the Philippines, to recognize the sovereignty of America on this beloved soil.

On the contrary I say that I returned to these islands, transported on an American man-of-war, on the 19th of May last year, with the distinct and manifest intention of making war against the Spaniards in order to recover our liberty and independence. This is stated in my official proclamation of the 24th of the said month of May, and published in the manifesto addressed to the Filipino nation on the 12th of June last, when, in my native town of Cavite, I unfurled for the first time our blessed national flag as the sacred emblem of that sublime aspiration; and afterwards reasserted to the American General, General Merritt, the predecessor of General Otis, in the manifesto I addressed to the Filipino nation a few days before, demanding from the Spanish General Jaudenes the surrender of the city of Manila, in which manifesto it is clearly and distinctly stated that the forces of the United States, on sea and land, came to give us our liberty and to overturn the corrupt Spanish administration. I declare, once and forever, that both natives and foreigners are witnesses that the United States forces on land and sea have recognized by this belligerency of the Filipinos, not only respecting our national flag but according it public honors, as it was triumphantly navigated in our internal waters before all the foreign nations here represented by their respective consuls.

With reference to the instructions from His Excellency the President of the United States, alluded to in his proclamation by General Otis, dealing with the administration of the affairs of the Philippine Islands, I protest solemnly, in the name of God, the root and fountain of all justice, on behalf of my beloved brothers, against the intrusion of the Government of the United States in the sovereignty of these islands.

I thus protest, in the name of all the Filipino nation, against the intrusion referred to, because in reposing their confidence in me by electing me—unworthy though I may be—to the position of president of this nation they have imposed upon me the duty to maintain, even to death, the liberty and independence of the Filipinos as a nation.

Lastly, I protest against this unexpected act of the American Government in claiming sovereignty in these islands, in virtue of the documents in my possession dealing with my relations with the American authorities, the which state, in the most unequivocal manner, that the United States did not bring me here from Hongkong to make war against the Spaniards in the interests of the United States, but for the sake of our liberty and independence, for the preservation of which I received verbal pledges, together with a promise from them of help and efficacious cooperation. That is the position of affairs, and oh, my dear brothers, if we stand united throughout the country, they can not filch from us the idea of the liberty and absolute independence which has been our noble aspiration.

Help all of you to effect the end desired with the force that comes from conviction of the justice of our demands. There must be no turning back in the path of glory upon which we have already entered.

AGUINALDO.

MALOS, January 5, 1898.

The above proclamation was posted throughout the city this morning, but was torn down by order of the United States authorities.

I hear the Americans are sending out troops to protect the pumping station at the waterworks at Santo'an. If they do this, I feel sure hostilities will commence. The natives will not make the first move, but they will resist any hostile move on the part of the Americans.

The situation is certainly very threatening. It is lamentable to think that it is due to the procrastination of the Americans to declare a firm and definite policy with regard to the Philippines.

General Whittier, before the peace commission:

"On October 25, in the company of H. L. Higgins, general manager of the Manila Railway, Limited, to Malolos for an interview arranged the day before with Aguinaldo. I found his headquarters were in a very nice house, ten minutes drive from the railway station; a guard of twenty or thirty soldiers in the courtyard below. We were soon ushered by one of his officers

who spoke English to the waiting room upstairs, and I met Buen Camino, a wise looking counsellor, whom I met at Ayuntamiento the day after the fall of Manila. He carried up to the presence of the insurgent leader and president, who was dressed, contrary to his usual daily garb, in a black smoking jacket of low cut, waistcoat, and trousers, both black, large white tie; in fact, the evening dress common at our clubs during the summer."

Lieut. John D. Ford, United States Navy, of the *Olympia*, in a Baltimore interview: "Aguinaldo is in every sense a patriot, and I believe he is sincere in his efforts for his people and means well. He is also a fighter, and says he means to keep on warring until the natives get a government of their own."

John Barrett, ex-minister to Siam, in Review of Reviews, July, 1899:

"When Manila was occupied on August 13, and Aguinaldo was not allowed to share the honors of occupation and he was asked to withdraw his forces from the neighborhood of Manila, he advanced the very logical argument that according to General Merritt's remarkable agreement with General Jaudenes it was possible that the American forces might withdraw from Manila and leave the Spaniards in possession; and hence he wished to be in a strong position in or about Manila to fight the Spaniards if necessary. This situation gave Aguinaldo a unique strength of argument in his discussions with the American leaders, of which he took full advantage. When he would say that he could not withdraw far from Manila, because the Americans did not themselves know then whether they would remain in possession of the islands, it was impossible for his statement to be refuted. In fact, from a logical standpoint, his conclusion was altogether wise, for if he had withdrawn and left the Spaniards in control of Manila they could have held out until the arrival of reinforcements, and prepared themselves to reorganize the island."

One of Dewey's officers, writing January 31, 1899, said:

"Aguinaldo reached Manila on May 20 of last year, at which time there was no evidence, that we knew of, of a native organization. He created an army in a short time, and immediately commenced to win victories. These were to us at the time astonishing, for he defeated detachment after detachment of the Spanish army, took fort after fort, captured regiments with arms and ammunition, and in a short time had captured every Spanish soldier on the island of Luzon or had driven those not captured into Manila. Before August 31 these insurgents had actually captured the whole of Luzon, excepting Manila, from the Spaniards. After taking all of Luzon, with the exceptions named, they conquered the Spanish in the island of Negros and the city of Cebu, and before we reached Iloilo they had that city and the whole island of Panay."

Consul-General Pratt, of Singapore, to Secretary Day, April 23, 1898:

"General Aguinaldo impressed me as a man of intellectual ability, courage, and worthy of the confidence that had been placed in him. No close observer of what has transpired in the Philippines during the past four years could have failed to recognize that General Aguinaldo enjoyed, above all others, the confidence of the Philippine insurgents, and the respect alike of the Spanish and foreigners in the islands, all of which vouched for his justice and high sense of honor."

AGUINALDO AND HIS OFFICERS.

John Foreman, in Contemporary Review, July, 1898, with other papers published by Congress with the treaty of peace:

"Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo is a smart, intelligent man, of a serious mein, small in stature, and apparently a little over 30 years of age. He has served as the petty governor of his native town in Cavite province and speaks Spanish very well for a native. He is by no means an adventurer, with all to gain and nothing to lose, but a landed proprietor. He is a would-be reformer of his country, but, convinced that all appeal to Spain is futile, he has at last resorted to force. General Primo de Rivera is now safely back in Madrid, and the Philippine islanders and the treaty of Bac na Bato are laughed at. This is a repetition of Cuban policy. It is on these grounds that Aguinaldo holds himself justified in returning to the scene of his battles, not again to fight for reforms to be effected by those who have no honor, but to cooperate in forcing the Spaniards to evacuate the islands."

Joseph T. Mannix, in Review of Reviews, June, 1898:

"I was in Manila last autumn (1897), inquiring into the conditions—political, social, and industrial. * * * I met many kind-hearted and courteous rebel leaders in Manila. These men were holding regular meetings, raising money with which to prosecute the insurrection, and were in constant communication with Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo and the other rebel leaders, who were then quartered in the mountains immediately to the northward from Manila. * * * I went secretly beyond the city walls and mingled with the natives at Malabon and elsewhere. The home of every rebel or rebel sympathizer was the hospitable resting place of any American or other traveler

who was taking sufficient interest in these people to investigate the situation. That they are a law-abiding people and easily governed is evident from the fact that when the present insurrection began, in August, 1896, there were but 1,500 Spanish troops in the islands—about one-twentieth the number that the British Government has garrisoned in Ireland to-day. And these 1,500 troops were natives of the islands.

"That they are entirely amenable to discipline when they have confidence in and respect for their leaders and advisers is evident by the fact that for more than a year Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo, their acknowledged leader, was able to maintain good order and comparatively good discipline among his 40,000 to 50,000 followers, and under circumstances where chaos and disorder would be the most natural conditions."

Rounseville Wildman, United States consul at Hongkong, to Assistant Secretary Moore, July 18, 1898:

"There has been a systematic attempt to blacken the name of Aguinaldo and his cabinet on account of the questionable terms of their surrender to Spanish forces a year ago this month. It has been said that they sold their country for gold, but this has been conclusively disproved, not only by their own statements, but by the speech of the late Governor-General Rivera in the Spanish senate June 11, 1898. He said that Aguinaldo undertook to submit if the Spanish Government would give a certain sum to the widows and orphans of the insurgents. He then admits that only a tenth part of this sum was ever given to Aguinaldo, and that the other promises made he did not find it expedient to keep.

"I was in Hongkong in September, 1897, when Aguinaldo and his leaders arrived under contract with the Spanish Government. They waited until the 1st of November for the payment of the promised money and the fulfillment of the promised reforms. Only \$400,000, Mexican, was ever placed to their credit in the bank, and on the 3d of November Mr. F. Agoncilla, late minister of foreign affairs in Aguinaldo's cabinet, called upon me and made a proposal, which I transmitted to the State Department in my dispatch No. 19, dated November 3, 1897. In reply the State Department instructed me 'to courteously decline to communicate with the Department further regarding the alleged mission.' I obeyed these instructions to the letter until the breaking out of the war, when, after consultation with Admiral Dewey, I received a delegation from the insurgent junta, and they bound themselves to obey all laws of civilized warfare and to place themselves absolutely under the orders of Admiral Dewey if they were permitted to return to Manila. At this time their president, Aguinaldo, was in Singapore negotiating through Consul General Pratt with Admiral Dewey for his return."

Rounseville Wildman, United States consul at Hongkong, to Mr. Day, November 3, 1897:

"Since my arrival in Hongkong I have been called upon several times by Mr. F. Agoncilla, foreign agent and high commissioner, etc., of the new republic of the Philippines. Mr. Agoncilla holds a commission, signed by the president, members of cabinet, and general in chief of the republic of Philippines, empowering him absolutely with power to conclude treaties with foreign governments.

"He is a very earnest and attentive diplomat and a great admirer of the United States."

Gen. Charles A. Whittier before the Peace Commission:

"From that time the military operations and the conduct of the insurgents have been most creditable. Positions taken and the movement of troops show great ability on the part of some leader. I do not say it was necessarily Aguinaldo, but he gave the directions."

E. Spencer Pratt, United States consul at Singapore, to Secretary Day:

"SINGAPORE, April 28, 1898.

"I have the honor to report that I sent you on the 27th instant, and confirmed in my dispatch of No. 211 of that date, a telegram, which, deciphered, read as follows:

"SECRETARY OF STATE, Washington:

"General Aguinaldo gone my instance Hongkong arrange with Dewey co-operation insurgents Manila.

"PRATT."

"The General impressed me as a man of intelligence, ability, and courage, and worthy the confidence that had been placed in him."

Consul Pratt to Secretary Day, Singapore, June 2, 1898, with inclosure:

"I have the honor to submit inclosed a telegram from Hongkong of the 25th ultimo, on the situation in the Philippines, published in Singapore yesterday afternoon, the 1st instant.

"Considering the enthusiastic manner General Aguinaldo has been received by the natives and the confidence with which he already appears to have inspired Admiral Dewey, it will be admitted, I think, that I did not overrate his importance and that I have materially assisted the cause of the United States in the Philippines in securing his cooperation."

SECRETARY OF NAVY, *Washington*:

Receipt of telegram of June 14 is acknowledged. Aguinaldo, insurgent leader, with 13 of his staff, arrived May 19, by permission, on *Naushan*. Established self Cavite, outside arsenal, under protection of our guns, and organized his army. I have had several conferences with him, generally of a personal nature. Consistently I have refrained from assisting him in any way with the force under my command, and on several occasions I have declined requests that I should do so, telling him the squadron could not act until the arrival of the United States troops. At the same time I have given him to understand that I consider insurgents as friends, being opposed to a common enemy. He has gone to attend a meeting of insurgent leaders for the purpose of forming a civil government.

"MORE CAPABLE OF SELF-GOVERNMENT THAN THE NATIVES OF CUBA, AND I AM FAMILIAR WITH BOTH RACES."

Aguinaldo has acted independently of the squadron, but has kept me advised of his progress, which has been wonderful. I have allowed to pass by water recruits, arms, and ammunitions, and to take such Spanish arms and ammunition from the arsenal as he needed. Have advised frequently to conduct the war humanely, which he has done invariably. My relations with him are cordial, but I am not in his confidence. The United States has not been bound in any way to assist insurgents by any act or promises, and he is not, to my knowledge, committed to assist us. I believe he expects to capture Manila without my assistance, but doubt ability, they not yet having many guns. In my opinion, these people are far superior in their intelligence and more capable of self-government than the natives of Cuba, and I am familiar with both races.

DEWEY.

GENERAL ANDERSON ASKED AGUINALDO TO COOPERATE WITH HIM IN MILITARY OPERATIONS.

When Admiral Dewey sent the above dispatch there were no American troops in the Philippines. The first detachment, under command of General Anderson, did not arrive until June 30, three days after the sending of the afore-quoted dispatch from Hongkong, and, landing in Cavite, General Anderson lost no time in putting himself in communication with Aguinaldo, whose forces had locked up the Spanish in Manila. On the 4th of July, anniversary of the great Republic's natal day, General Anderson wrote:

"Señor DON EMILIO AGUINALDO,

Commanding Philippine Force, Cavite, Luzon.

"GENERAL: I have the honor to inform you that the United States of America, whose land forces I have the honor to command in this vicinity, being at war with the Kingdom of Spain, has entire sympathy and most friendly sentiments for the native people of the Philippine Islands. For these reasons I desire to have the most amicable relations with you and to have you and your people cooperate with us in military operations against the Spanish forces."

ANDERSON SAID AMERICANS CAME "TO FIGHT IN THE CAUSE OF YOUR PEOPLE."

Now, clearly after receiving such communication Aguinaldo had good reason to believe that General Anderson, and as representing the United States, sympathized with the aspirations of the Filipino people. Or rather, would we say, there was nothing in such communication to disabuse Aguinaldo of such belief, but only that to confirm him in the undoubted impression that his negotiations with Consul-General Wildman and others had left upon him. Aguinaldo promptly rejoined to this communication of General Anderson in one of like friendly tenor, whereupon General Anderson, on July 6th, wrote to Aguinaldo, and requesting him to set aside additional camping ground for American troops, as follows:

"I am encouraged by the friendly sentiments expressed by your excellency in your welcome letter received on the 5th instant to endeavor to come to a

definite understanding, which I hope will be advantageous to both. Very soon we expect a large addition to our forces, and it must be apparent to you, as a military officer, that we will require much more room to camp our soldiers and also storeroom for our supplies. [Cavite alone was then in control of the American forces. Over all the other territory around Manila Aguinaldo's forces held control.] For this I would like to have your excellency's advice and cooperation, as you are best acquainted with the resources of this country."

And three weeks later yet, before the arrival of General Merritt and when General Anderson was still in supreme command, we find him requesting Aguinaldo for assistance in procuring means of transportation for the American Army, "as it is to fight in the cause of your people." Clearly we have not done by Aguinaldo as we led him to expect.



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